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Memo on No. 71-1336
In re Griffiths
WCK
January 9, 1972
This memorandum will simply be a brief statement
of my views.

I dismiss out of a hand petitioner's

arg•ument III, that the citizenship requirement
violates the First Amendment and international law.
Nor am I particularly impressed with petitioner 1 s argument
II, that the citizenship requirement conflicts with
a federal statutory policy in favor of attracting
alien professionals, although if petitioner has a strong
constitutional argument, that may support giving the
federal statute considerable leeway.
I turn, then, to the constitutional argument.

Petitioner

relies on two sets of cases, the alienage cases and the
bar admission •cases-"she argues that the regulation
is unconstitutional under either set of cases.
have just re-read Graham v. Richardson, 403
and find it a little strange.

u.s.

I
365,

Early in the discussion

of of the case law, Justice Blackmun points out that
"It has long been settled, and it is not disputed
here, that the term 'person' in !the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment] encompasses lawfully admitted
resident aliens as well as citizens of the United
States and entitles both citizens and aliens to
the equal protection of the laws of the Statex in
which they reside." 403 U.S. P at 371.
The opinion then cites and distinguishes the rational
basis cases with the commenta
"But the Court's decisions h?ve established that
classifications based on 1
7 ·,~II$ alienage,
like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny." 403 u.s., at 371 .. 372 •

..

--2-The close

scrUi~ny

is justified because resident aliens

are peculiarly unable to •protect themselves througha
the political process.

More broadly, it is "right"

to give them equal protection of the laws because they
bear the responsibilities of our social system-"e.g.,
taxes and the draft ...... and contribute in important ways
to the national wellbeing.

While a political commljnity

must have the right to define its membership, Congress
has plenary power to do so at the border.
Despite so flat a statement as the statement that
alienage is a suspect classification, however, the
Graham opinion goes on to discuss the federal social
security act and to note that
"We have no occasion to decide whther Congress,
in the exercise of the immigration and naturalization
.,. power, could itself enact a statute imposing on
aliens a uniform nationwide residency requirement
as a condition of federally funder welfare benefits."
403 u.s., at 382.
While this footnote wasH

22

1 tied to a discussion of

Shapiro v. Thompson , it would seems to be a gratUtous
reservation of judgment after the Court 0 s straightforward
suspect classification discussion.
In any event, _.,•. -~e-illt a classification based
on~ienage

is subject to close scrutiny in cases where,

as in Graham, the state is dividing a limited pie(welfare
benefits).

The case would seem to be even stronger

where, as here, the pie is only speculatively limited-"
that is, there can be an unlimited number of attorneys

--3- ..

admitted to the Connecticut bar, and the only loss
suffered by dtizens is the possible loss of business
on the part of citizen lawyers.

And, as the state points

out, "there are relatively few lawyers immigrating to
the United States", Brief at 31,

In short, the

exclusion of resident aliens from the Connecticut bar
penalizes those aliens without any immediate benefit
to citizens.

Compare Graham v. Richardson; Takahashi

v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334

u.s.

410(1948)(fishing rights).

Of course, even though the classification is subject
to close scrutiny, it may be upheld if the state can
show a compelling state interest.

At this point, the

bar admission cases become relevant.

As 1 read those

cases, they stand for the proposition that the state
bar is entitled to insist of competence and on a commitment
to support the Constitliltion, but that it is not entitled
to add objectionable requirements to be "doubly sure",
As the Court stated in Baird v. State of Arizona, 401

u.s.

1(1971), the bar may insist that an applicant has "the
qualities of character and the professional competence
requisite to the practice of law," 401

u.s.,

at 7.

Petitioner admits that she must pass the bar exam(it
is not clear whether she has done so already) and that
she must take an oath to sqport the Constitution.
The state seem to maintain that even though it has
no reason to think that petitioner cannot conscientiously

- .. 4--

take the oath, it may nevertheless presume that no resident
alien can take it,

As petitioner points out, however,

resident aliens are permitted (indeed in some circumstances,
required) to join the armed forces and take a stringent
oath to support the Constitution.

In sum, the

requirement of citizenship would be in for tough
sledding apart from the alienage cases- .. with them,
I do not see how tre requirement can pass constitutional
muster.
According to the briefs, petitioner is eligible to
become a citizen because she is married to a citizen,
Professor John Griffiths of NYU law school.

The fact

that she has not dolle so should, in my view, make no
difference in this case.

Neither Takahashi nor Graham

makes a distinction between those eleigible for citizenship
and those not eligible, nor does eligibility for
citizenship have any effect on the social obligations
of the resident alien.

Since one is required to

renounce his former citizenship to obtain American
citizenship, the step is a major one cutting oneself
off from his family andbackground,

Finally, I see

no point in deciding more than one case on the que,stion
whether a state may constitutionally bar resident
aliens from admission to the bar,

"

.
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The close scrUi~ny is justified because resident aliens
are peculiarly unable to •protect themselves througn.
the political process.

More broadly, it is "right"

to give them equal protection of the laws because they
bear the responsibilities of our social system--e.g,,
taxes and the draft--and contribute in important ways
to the national wellbeing.

While a political commgnity

must have the right to define its membership, Congress
has plenary power to do so at the border.
Despite so flat a statement as the statement that
alienage is a suspect classification, however, the
Graham opinion goes on to discuss the federal social

0.)

security act and to note that

~
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admitted to the Connecticut bar, and the only loss
suffered by dtizens is the possible loss of business
on the part of citizen lawyers.

And, as the state points

out, "there are relatively few lawyers immigrating to
the United States". Brief at 31.

In short, the

exclusion of resident aliens from the Connecticut bar
penalizes those aliens without any immediate benefit
to citizens.
v. Fish & Game

Compare Graham v. Richardson; Takahashi
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u.s.

410(1948)(fishing rights).

Of course, even though the classification is subject
to close scrutiny, it may be upheld if the state can
show a compelling state interest.

At this point, the

bar admission cases become relevant.

0

As I read those

cases, they stand for the proposition that the

~tate

bar is entitled to insist of competence and on a commitment
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to add objectionable requirements to be "doubly sure".
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1(1971), the bar may insist that an applicant has "the
qualities of character and the professional competence
requisite to the practice of law." 401

u.s.,

at 7.

Petitioner admits that she must pass the bar exam(it
is not clear whether she has done so already) and that
she must take an oath to sqport the Constitution.
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The state seem to maintain
that even though it has

no reason to think that petitioner cannot conscientiously
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required) t o join the armed forces and take a stringent
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requirement of citizenship would be in for tough
I
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\
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muster,
According to the briefs, petitioner is eligible to
become a citizen because she is married to a citizen,
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The fact
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citizenship have any effect on the social obligations
of the resident alien,

Since one is required to

renounce his former citizenship to obtain American
citizenship, the step is a major one cutting oneself
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Finally, I see

no point in deciding more than one case on the question
whether a state may constitutionally bar resident
aliens from admission to the bar,
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In Re Application of Fre Le Poole Griffiths for Admission
....
to the Bar
Appeal from Conn SC
~ex

Appellant is a citizen of the Netherlands who is

married to a U.S. citizen and has chosen to live in this
tL

~

country as a re ident alien rather than

KRRMN

renouncing

her citizenship and becoming an American citizen.
I'-

She is

in all other respects qualified to take the Conn bar

~

ex~

except that the state bar requires that all applicants be
American citiznes.

When her application to take the bar

was refused on this grounds, she sought relief in the state
courts. The state SC ultimately rejected her claim. She
brings this direct appeal to the Court.
She raises three grounds for her appeal. First, she

-2-

argues that the state policy violates her rights under
equal protection clause.
to

pe~ns--aliens

The eqyel protection clause appl\es

as well as citizens, and

the ~a~~ 1

that any discrimination against aliens must be jsstified
by a compelling state interest.

The state interests asserted

by the state are that lawyers are officers of the court, that
in Conn, lawyers are commissioners of the Superior Court and
can issue process, administer notes on the order of a NEKRXX
notary public, and that lawyers must be loyal to the political
system.

Appellant argues xR•Rxx that

th~~irst

two are in no

way related to citizenship and that she is willing to swear
an oath, required of all applicants to the bar in Conn, to
support and defend the RENXXNX Constitution.

She notes that

in a series of cases decided last year, particularly Law_
Students Research Concil v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, the Court
struck down varioss restrictions on admission to the bar
including a six-month residency requirement.
very narrow oath to support the Constitution.

It upheld a
To all this,

appellee can only repy with an assertion that the rule is
resonable.

It of course must be both reasonable and compelling.

Second, appelleant argues that the Conn law is an
infringement on the federal government's exclusive power to

t

XR~X~KXE

regulate immigration and is hence void under the

\ pre-emption doctrine based on federal supremacy.

5he notes

that last year in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U,S. 365 (1971),
the Court stuck down a restriction on giving welfare to aliens
on this ground. If an alien could not obtain the basic support
on which to live, assuming he could not find work, than he

-3-

ENMXN might be discouraged from moving here, despite federal
policy to the contrary.

In this connection she notes that

high on the x«xx list of preferences for aliens to be admitted
to

~kx«

this country as residents are certain professionals,

including lawyers.

If they cannot practice their profession

once they areive, then the federal policy of encouraging them
to immigrate will be effective frustrated by the state in
violation of the federal government's exclusvie pol icy-I}l.aking
role in this area.

In response to all this, appellee can only

say that there is no deinal of the right to travel, wx« which
is ax not at all the issue.
Finally, appellant argues that the state law is inviolation
of the United Nations policy, which she says is xxx also
reflected in the 1st amendment inx favor of permitting
persons to freely choose their own nationality.

~I

~sx~kxx

For this, there is little precedential support, as

app~llee

notes.
I think this case should be notedo
issue.

This is a serious

It does not seem to me that xxx±xx that there is any

compelling state interest in requireing all lawyers to be
citizens if their is another way of requiring them to uphold
the laws of this Es&HXX country.

Such a rule is the kind of

narrow-minded provinchalism which this country should avoid.
Fox
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January 12, 1973

Re: No. 1336 In Re Application of Griffith•

Dear Bill:
As I did not speak to you after we adjoumed today, I write
to confirm that I will be glad to do the opinion in this case.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Douglas
lfp/ss

.'

Notes on No. 71-1336
In re Griffiths
WCK
January 13, 1973
1.

B~

r admission casess

Baird v. Arizona, 401 u.s. 1
LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
In re Stolar, 401 u.s. 23.
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 u.s. 232i
Konisberg v. State Bar, 353 u.s. 252.& 366 u.s. 36,
Appl~cation of Park, 484 P.2d 690(1laska, 1971)
Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 496 P,2d 1264
(Cal. 1972)
Spevack v. Kleim, 385 u.s, 511(1967)
2. Alien casess
Astrup v. INS, 402 U.S. 509(1971)
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U,Sj 365(1971)
Yick Wo.v. Hopkins, 118 u.s. 356(1886)
Truax v. Raich, 239 u.s. 33(1915)
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 u.s. 410(1948)
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 u.s. 698.
3. Baird v. State ~ar of Arizona, 401 U.S•1
BLACK, with whom Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall joined.
opinion reviewd the bar admission case law-in addition to those cited above, see In re Summers,
325 u.s. 561(1945); In re Anastaplo, 366 u.s. 82.
Mrs. Baird refused to answer the question whether she
had ever been a member of the Communist Party or any
orgainization "that advocate&!ls :ttim overthrow of tre
United States Government by force or violence1"
She refused to answer this question, and the bar
committee refused to ~ process her application
fut:ther,
"The First Amendment's protection of association
prohibits a State from excluding a person from a
professuon or punishing him solely because he is
a member of a particular pxolitical organization
or because he holds certain beliefs. United States
v. Robel, 389 u.s. 258, 266(1967); Ke~ishian
v, RBDI!: Board of Regents, 385 u.s. 5 9, 607(1967)." at 6,
"Of course Arizona has a legitimate interest in
»
determining whether petitioner has the qualities of
character and the professional competence requisite
to the practice of a law," at 7.
STEWART, concurringx in the judgment. _
"It follows from these decisionsLRobel, LSCRRg_7
that mere membership in an organization can never, by
itself, be sufficient ground for a State's imposition
of civil disabilities or criminal punishment. Such
membership can be quite different from knowing membership in an organization advocating the overthrow of
the Government by force or violence, on the part of
one sharing the specific intent to further the organizatiodsX
illegal goals." at 9,
WHITE dissenting(applies to Stolar as well)
White takes the position, essentially, that the
question is relevant even if a yes answer would not
be enough to exclude the person from the bar.
BLACKMUN, with whom the Chief, Harlan, and White join.

--2--

4. In re Smtolar, 401 u.s. 23(1971)
BLACK, for himself, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall
"We conclude that Ohio may not require an appplicant for admission to the Bar to state whether he
has been or is a 'member of any organization
whaich advocates the overthrow of the government
of the Unite<dl States v. force.' As we noted above,
the First Amendment prohibitis Ohio from penalizing
a man solely because he is a member of a particular
organization." at 30
"He answered numerous prying question about personal
affairs that could hardly have been necessary for
a State interested only in whether he would make an
hoanest lawyer faithful to his clients." at 30
STEWART e concurred in the jddgment,
Four justices dissented,
5. LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154(1971)
STEWART for the Court1
"The three- judge District Court • • • was
unanimous is finding no constitutional infirmity in
New YOrk's statutory requirement that applicants for
admission to its Bar must possess ' the character
and gxeneral fitness requisite for an attornye and
counsellor-at-law." We have no dlifficulty
in affirming this holding. /citing cases/
Long usage in New yUrk and elsewhere has given welldefined contours to this req virement, which the appellees
have construed narrowly as encompassing no more thaxn
0
dishonorable conduct relevant to the legal profession
• • •• " at 159.
petitioners 0 basic challenge was not to the standards for
admission to the bar but to the methods used to determine
whether a particular ~§applicant qualifies r under those
standards.
"As stated at the outset of this x opinion,
New York has further standards of elegibility
for admission to its Bar. An applicant must
be a United States citizen and a New York resident
of six months' standing. And before heR may
be finally admitted to praxctice, an applicant
must swear(or affirm) that he will support the
Constitutions of the United States and od x the
State of New York" at 161.
"The appi:ellants do not take isssue with tl'Y:l
citizenship and minimum-residence requirements, nor
with the items on the questionnaires for applicants
dealing with these requirements. Their constitutional
attack is mounted against the requirement of belief
8
in any form of' and loyalty to the Government of
tije United States, and upon those parts of the
questionnaires directed thereto." at 161.
no challenge to the requirement of an oath
»KXRx~KEiRX»XBBBX»RXXRBXKBXX»XXgmmsXXKEXXBRX~XxBR

XXX-XB.JIJDI!XXID!ll

The"in any form"rule upheld based on the construction
given it by appellees.

--3--

6. Spevack v, Klein, 385 u.s. 511(1967),
a case invovling the privilege against compulsory self-incriination
DOUGLAS FOR FOUR MEMBERS OF THE COURTY
An attorney refused to honor a subpoena duces
tecum served on him in the course of judicial proceedings.
New York then disbarred him.
"The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional
standing, profesS.. anal reputation, and of livelihood
are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer
relinquish the privilege." at 516
F~AKS concurred in the judgment.
HARtAM, for himself, Clark, ans Stewart, dissented.
WHITE also dissented.
7. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353

u.s.

232,

--4--

8. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 u.s. 356(1886),
a municipal ordinance discriminatorily enforced
against Cmineses laudries. Chinese operators were arrested.
"The Fourteenth Amendmen to the Constitution is not
confined to the protection of citizens. It says
: 'Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or proerty without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." These provisions are
universal in their applbation, to all persons within
the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to
any differences of race, of color, or of naxtionality;
and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of
the protection of equal laws," at 369
The Court also noted a treaty with China and, instersetingly,
R.S. 1977, now 42 u.s.c. 1981 and 1982,
citing the maxim that this is a government not of men
but of laws, the Court indicated that the ordinance,
though neutral on its face, gave the possibility
for arbitrary exercise of power
there, however, no need to "reason from the probable
to the actual"because the record showed arbitrary
application
"It appears that both petitioners have complied with
every requisite, deemed by the law or by the
public officers harged with its administration,
necessary for the protection of neighboring property
from fie, or as a precaustion against injury to
the public." at 374
"And while this consent of the supervisors is
withheld from them and from two hundred others k
who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to
be Chinese subjects, eighty others, not Chinese
subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business
under similar conditions." at 374.

9. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
GRAY for the Court:

u.s.

698(1893)

The Court reasoned that the government has the inherent
power to exclude aliens from the country.
"The right of a nation to expel or deport
foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken
any steps towards becoming citizens of the
country, rests upon the same grounds, and is am
as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit
and prevent their entral!:nce into the country."
at 707.
"Chinese laborers, therefore, like all other
alimens residing in the United States for a shorter
or longer time, are entitled, so long as they are
permitted by the government of the United States
to remain in the country, to the safeguards of
the Constitution, and to be protection of the laws,
in regard to their rights of person and of property,
and to their civil and criminal responsJtibility."
at 724,
petitioners had f:B led to obtain certificates and were
being expelled--the Court held that this was not
unconstitutional

--5--

BREWER dissented, showing lis broad-mindednessa
"It is true that this statute is directed only
against the obnoxious Chinese; but if the power
exists, who shall say it will not be exercised
to-morrow against other classes and other people7"
at 743
colorful language at 744
found the statute to be a denial of due process
FIELD dissenteda
noted that a laborerw must establish his right to
remain in the country by the testimony of at least
one credible white witness
FULLLER, C,J. dissented
10. Truax v. Raicij, 239 u.s. 33(1915)
HUGHES FOR THE COURT
person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
includes aliens at 39
Arizona statute which made it a crime for one who employs
more than five workers to fail to employ
eighty per cent"qualified electors or native-born citizens
of the United States or some sub-division thereof."
Petitioner was a resident alien from Austria(employed as a cook)

It

"The discrimination defined by the act des not pertain
to the regulations or disttribution of the public
domain, or of the common property or resources of
the people of the State, the enjoyment of which may
be limited to its citizens as against both aliens
and the citizens of other States." at 39-40,
citing cawses presumably later overruled
"and it should be added that the act is not limited
to persons who are engaged on public work or receive
the benefit of public moneys." at 40,
"But this admitted authority /the police power/ with
the broad range of legislative discretion that it
implies, does not go so far as to make it possible
for the State to deny to lawful inhabitants,
because of their race or nationality, the ordinary
means of eartning a livelihood. It requires nox
argument to show that the right to work for a living
in the common occupations of the community is of the
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity
that Xit was the prupose of the Amendment to secure."
citing cases, including Yick Wo,
"if this could be refused Ita solely upon the ground
of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denia;
to any person of the equal protection of the laws
would be a barren form of words" at 40

"The discrimination agaire t aliens in the wide range
of employments to which the act relates is made an
end in itself and thus the authority to a deny
aliens, upon the mere /end of 41/ fact of their
alienage, the right to obtain support in the ordinary
fields of labor is necessarily involved." at 41-42.

--6--

additionally, the Cart points out that exclusion of
alien&s is a federal and not a state matter
MC REYNOLDS dissented,
j

emu

1l,iakahashi v, Fish and Game Commission, 334

u.s.

410(1948)

challenge to a California statute barring issuance
of cemmercial fishing licenses to persons "ineligible
to citizenship"
Korematsu v. United States, 323 u.s. 214(expulsion
of Japanese)
BLACK for the Court
emphasizes that Congress has more powers than the
states--fact that Congress uses a classification
does not entitle& a state to do so--power
over citizenship a federal one
quotes 1981 and 1982, stating that "The protection
of this section has been held to extend to aliens
as well as to citizens," at 419, citing
Yick Wo and three other cases "Consequently the
section Xk&xxkH and the Fourteenth Amaxe&ndment on
which x it rests in part protect 'all pers ons 8
against state legislxation bearing unequally
upon them either because of alienage or color."
at 420,
"All of the foregoin emphasizes the tenuousness of the state's claim that it has power to
single out and ban its alwful alien inhabitants,
and particularly certain racial and color groups
within this class of inhabitants, from following
a voation simply e because Congress has put some
such groups in special classifications in exercise
of its broad axnd wholly distinguishable powers over
immigration and naturalization." at 420,
distiguishes briefly the cases which have sustained
state laws barring aliens ineligible to citizenship
frm land ownership, stating that even assuming
their continuing validity, they dealt with real
property.
MURPHY, with whom Rutledge joined, concurring
REED, with whom Jackson joined, dissented,

,, ' '

,.

--7--

12. Graham v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 365(1971)
constitutionality of Arizona and Pennsylvania
welfare
"The classifications involved in the instant cases,
on the other hand, are inherently suspect and are therefore
subject to strict judicial scrutiny whether or not
a fundamental right is impaired." at 376.
Appellants' attempted reliance on Dandridge v. Williams,
397 u.s. 471(1970), is also misplaced, since the
classification involved in that

AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
IN FRANCE
21, Avenue George V
Paris VIII
January 26, 1973

The Honorable Warren E. Burger
Chief Justice of the United States
United States Supreme Court
Washington, D.C.
In re Application of
Fre Le Poole Griffiths,
for Admission to the Bar
No. 71-1336
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
We understand that in the course of the oral argument
for the above-captioned case on January 9, 1973, counsel for
Appellant was asked from the bench about the number of foreign
countries that allow United States citizens to practice law
within their boundaries.

The purpose of this letter is to provide

1/

a further and more complete answer to that question.-

The American Chamber of Commerce in France is the leading
American commercial and professional organization in France.

l/

The

Twenty additional copies of this letter are provided herewith,
and copies have been sent by air mail today to all parties in the
case.

2

Mr. Justice Burger

January 26, 1973

organization· was founded in 1894 and is affiliated with the United
States Chamber of Commerce.

At present, the American Chamber of

Commerce in France has a total membership of nearly 2000 individuals
and companies and counts among its members 92 American lawyers in
active practice.

The progress of this case has been closely fol-

lowed in France and other European countries, and the outcome of
the case may significantly affect the continued right of American
lawyers to practice in several of these jurisdictions.
There are at least twenty foreign countries in which
American lawyers are lawfully engaged in one or more categories
of the practice of law.

In none of these countries have American

lawyers been required to trade their U.S. citizenship for that of

2/

the foreign country as a pre-condition to lawful practice.-

~/

The admission to practice of foreign lawyers by these countries
is undoubtedly grounded on a variety of policies, some of which may
not be primarily based on a commitment to the principle of nondiscrimination. For example, some jurisdictions may authorize
foreign lawyers to practice because such countries believe that
this policy facilitates foreign trade and investment, and promotes
the development of private international law. See Foreign Branches
of Law Firms: The Development of Lawyers Equipped to Handle International Practice, SO Harv. L. Rev. 1284 {1967); ~ also Busch,
The Right of United States Lawyers to Practice Abroad, 3 Int'l
Lawyer 297 (1969).

Mr. Justice Burger

A~cording

Jcn uary 26, 1973

3

to the Foreign Section of the Martindale-

Hubbell Law Directory for 1972, American lawyers and law
firms are now in private practice in the following foreign

.

3/

countrJ.es:-

Belgium
Brazil
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
England
Ethiopia
France
Germany
Israel
Italy
Japan
Libya ·
Mexico
Peru
Portugal
Philippines
Spain
Thailand
Venezuela
Vietnam

1/

10 firms- 22
4
1
1 firm
2
12 firms- 30
1
26 firms- 83
8
2
4 firms- 5
8 firms- 15
1
4 firms- 16
1
1
4
2 firms- 2
3 firms- 10
2 firms- 4
2
1 firm

-

-

lawyers
lawyers
la-.;,\ryer
lawyers
lawyers
lawyer
lawyers
lawyers
lawyers
lawyers
lawyers
lawyer
lawyers
lawyer
lawyer
lawyers
lawyers
lawyers
lawyers
lawyers

4 Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory 1241-1308 (1972).
These figures are necessarily incomplete.
On July 12,
1972, the Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Lawyer Regulation
of the New York State, county and City Bar Associations
estimated that there were, for example, as many as 15
American law firms and 55 American lawyers in London.

4

Mr. Justice Burger

January 26, 1973

The nature of authorized legal practice by American
lawyers varies from country to country.
dictions,

In some juris-

foreign lawyers are admitted to practice under

the same conditions as local counsel.

In other . foreign

countries, where the practice of law is divided into two
or more branches, United States citizens may be eligible
to practice there in one branch, such as the giving of
legal advice, while being ineligible for another branch,
such as appearances before local courts.

In still other

countries, the subject matter of the foreign lawyer's

.

pract~ce

may be

.

.

4/

c~rcumscr~bed.-

A recent survey by the two leading international lawyers'
professional organizations, the Union Internationale des
Avocats and the International Bar Association, shows that
in nine countries an applicant

for admission to practice

as a lawyer need not be a national.

A/
21

51 This

survey further

See Foreign Branches of Law Firms, supra note 1, at 1288.

The nine countries are England (as a Barrister), Ireland
(as a Barrister), Israel, Norway, Scotland, Singapore, Tanzania,
Trinidad and Tobago,· and Zambia. Right of Establishment Abroad,
An Analysis of the Present Position, April 1972, in proceedings
of a joint meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats and
the International Bar Association in Estoril, Portugal, April
15-16, 1972 (unpublished) •

Mr. Justice Burger

January 26, 1973

5

shows that a foreign resident lawyer is permitted to undertake any type of legal or quasi-legal work (other than
practicing before the courts) in 13 countries, and in
eight other countries he is permitted to do so subject
to certain restrictions.
As an illustration, England authorizes American
lawyers to become barristers, and as such they may
practice before the English courts on the same terms as
English barristers.

Alternatively, American lawyers who

do not become barristers are authorized to give legal
advice within the scope of the regulations of the Law

6/
Society.In France, American lawyers may be licensed as legal
71
.
( conse1"1 s JUr1
.
"d"1ques ) .a d v1sers

.
1 ega 1 a d Sueh f ore1gn

visers have the same rights and are subject to the same
restrictions as French conseils juridiques,

~,

they may

give legal advice but may not appear before the French courts.
The French law is of particular significance to American

6/

See Foreign Branches of Law Firms, supra note 1, at 1294.

7_1

Law No. 71-1130 of Dec. 31, 1971,

[1972] J.O. No. 72-2.

Mr. Justice Burger

January 26, 1973
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lawyers, since it calls for a review of the right of foreign
lawyers to continue to practice in France after five years
(i.e., after December 31, 1976) if their countries of origin
have not by that time granted reciprocal rights to French lawyers
desiring to practice in such countries.

The information available

to us in Paris suggests, moreover, that the imposition of a
reciprocity requirement on foreign lawyers is now being seriously
considered by several other Western European countries.
We hope that the above information may be of assista.nce
to the court.
Very truly yours,

Richard H. Moore
President

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr.

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

February 11, 1973

I return herewith your draft of Griffiths, to which I have attached
a few riders in addition to the textual changes noted in pen.
I will comment first on the items listed by you as "omitted".
1. I do think the California and Alaska cases should be cited
in a note.

"

The California case - a unanimous decision - reflects a fairly

thoughtful analysis of the problem.
2. I do not think we need list the state laws which bar aliens.
3. and 4. If you can document that aliens did practice before thbs
Court in the 19th Century and that there is no present ruling barring them
(provided they are members of a state bar), I do think this is noteworthy.
5. I see no need to mention that citizenship was not challenged

****
I suggest that you produce a second draft, embodying my suggestions
(except where you wish to discuss them with me) and making such further
changes as you think appDopriate. In doing this, I have a couple of
questions of substance and a minor point or two of ver~, which I
would appreciate your considering:

.'I

,,

.

I

2.
(a) You "tred softly" in your equal protection analysis. You did
identify alienage as a "suspect" class (Graham), and that this required
"strict judicial scrutiny". You did not emphasize, deliberately I assume,
that this imposed the burden on the state to show a compelling interest,
a burden which the state made little pretense of carrying. There is some
language in the draft suggesting that the exclusion of aliens is an irrational
classification, and thus would not meet the rational basis test. California
so held in Raffaelli - although it went on to hold that the compelling interest
test was applicable.
As you know, I am more than a littile bit "nervious" with four
equal protection opinions being written in our chambers at the same time
and all involving the dichotomy between "rational" and "compelling" state

,

interest. I am inclined to think that you have been prudent in softpeddling this dialogue especially in view of divergent thinking among
the Justices. Nevertheless, I do wish you would focus on whether we
have said enough, and also on whether the terminology used in Griffiths

'

can be identified with the same authorship of terminology used by
Larry and Jay in the other cases we are writing.
(b) Part

m of the draft opinion is a little weak.

I have tried,

in the rider attached, to gtve it a little more muscle. I still think it
can be strengthened - if pot by "authority" by more imaginative use

~..

i

...

.

,

3.

0

of "mental muscle".

"'-'

(e) Now, a couple of verbiage points: (i) as a strong advocate
of women's lib, I note that you use the feminine pronoun throughout the
opinion. Where the reference is to the appellant, this is, of course,
appropriate. But where we are generalizing, I would think the
conventional male pronoun is more appropriate. This is in accord with
' the way statutes are drafted and most opinions written.
(ii) You use "attorney" rather than "lawyer", tiroughout the draft.
I personally prefer lawyer, and would like to use this term unless the

Connecticut statute and rules consistently use the word "attorney".

****
If you will put this opinion through a second draft early next week,
I will give it priority of review with the hope that it can be printed and

circulated certainly before we go back on the bench.
L. F. P., Jr.

P. S. I neglected to say above that there are a couple of quotations in
Seftvare v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.s. 232 that may merit inclusion
lh our opinion, perhaps in notes. Although Justice Black's language is a ·
bit ''homey", I like his paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 38 and
going down to the middle of page 239. I also like Frankfurther's description
of the role of a lawyer, although perhaps it could be used against our
present position. I would be inclined nevertheless to use in a footnote
two or three of the sentences in the first paragraph Whis c oneurring
opinion, especially the last sentence in the paragraph describing "moral
character" p. 249.

'>

!;

Memo to: William C. Kelly
February 17, 1973

From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

No. 71-1336 Griffiths
<J

I have reviewed the draft of February :wJ, 1973, and return it to
you herewith.
As you commented when you delivered it to me, you wish to reexamine it particularly with respect to its structure and arrangement.
I am not satisfied with this either, especially if we leave in the draft
the paragraph which purports to describe the consequences of a "suspect
classification." Accordingly, I have:
1. Revised page 4a in minor respects;
2. Redictated all of Part IT. As you will see, this is fairly major
surgery. I am satisfied that a major rewriting of Part II is necessary for
the purpose of applying the analysis on page 4a (as to a suspect classification)
to the facts in this case. Our draft of 2/8/73 was written without page 4a,
and it simply doesn't fit.
My redraft of Part II does not purport to be a finished product. I
deliver it to you for such editing and revision as you think necessary.
As you will see, I have not tried to coordinate the footnotes.

-2I think your revision of Part III is excellent.

*****
We have fallen behind schedule in circulating this opinion - for
reasons quite understandable. When you have finished your cert notes,
I hope you will give this priority and deliver a draft back to me, with

the view to circulating during next week.

L. F. P., Jr.

LFP, Jr. :psf
Attachment
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C HAMBE R S O F

JUSTI C E WILLIAM 0 . D O UGLAS

March 6, 1973

Dear Lewis :
Please join me in your excellent
opinion in 71-1336, Application of Fre Le
Poole Griffiths .

~

Douglas

Mr . Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

Mareh 6, 1973

Dear Harry:
Here is my first eireulatian of the Griffiths opinion.
I have tried to write it narrowly to avoid foreclosing the isaue
in No. 71-122~ ~garman v. Dougall. There is, however, inevitably
some overlap.

If you have any suggestions, after you have had an q)portunlty
to review my draft, I will certainly be happy to consider them.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justtee Blackmun

lfp/ss

March 7, 1973

Re: No. 71-1336 In re AppllcatlOD of Griffiths
Dear Harry:
I will, of course, be happy to hold Griffiths until you are ready
to bring Su~rrnan down.

stneerely,

Mr. .Justice Blaekmun

lfp/ss

I of'

,.

j;u.vrtntt Qfllurl ltf t4t 'JilniUb- j;tatt.s

'J)llrulfriugton. ~.

<!f.

2llb!Jt~

':HAMBERS OF

March 7, 1973

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 71-1336 - In re Application of Griffiths

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,~

T.M.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:
Conference

'•

.

J

.h:pum:t <!fourt ~ tqt ~tti:ttlt ~taftg
._aslfittgbm. ~. <!f. 2!l,;tJt.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

March 7, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1336 -

In Re Application of Griffiths

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for your note of March 6. I still have a
good bit of work to do on Sugarman, and it may be a few weeks
before I complete it. I am inclined to think that the two cases
should come down together and, if you would, I hope you do not
mind waiting until Sugarman is finished.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

'

'

.ju;prtmt <!fomt of tlft ~ttittb .jtattg
Jfa&frittghm, ~. <!f. 21lgtJl..;t
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 7, 1973

71-1336, Application of Griffiths
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~lt.}lrtmt QI~tttrt ~f tfrt 'J!lttitt~ ~tatts

'Jfagltingt~n. ~. ~· 20gt.l1~

/

CHAMBERS OF

JusTICE wM . J . BRENNAN. JR.

March 8, 1973

RE: No. 71-1336 In re Application of Fre Le
Poole Griffiths for Admission to the Bar
Dear Lewis:
I agree.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

€>nprttne <ronrt l,f t11e l1niffb .§tab's
WagJfingt~n. ]11. ~- :w;n;3
CHAMBE:RS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March

Re:

No.

8, 1973

71-1336 -Application of Griffiths

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

,,:;.··.

j}ttprtmt <qcurt cf tqt 'Jllttittb j}tates
'Jlins!yingtcn, ~. <q. . 2ll&l~.;l
CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 21, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1336 - In re Fre ·Le Poole Griffiths

Dear Lewis:
I voted in the minority at Conference, and plan to
write a dissent. Since the issues in this case are
relatively closely related to those in Sugarman v. Dougall,
I would rather draft one dissent for both opinions.
Therefore, unless it inconveniences you, I shall wait
till Harry circulates a draft in Sugarman before preparing
my joint dissent.

Sincerely,~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.Snvrttttt <!fon.rt cf tltt ~nittb ~taitg
~ag lfl::tt:gtcn. ~. <!f. 2.llbfJ!..;l
CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

March 22, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 71-1336

-

In re Griffiths

When Lewis circulated his opinion in this case,
I called and suggested to him the desirability of having
No. 71-1222, Sugarman v. Dougall, come down at the
same time. Lewis indicated that this was perhaps
desirable. Sugarman will be out in due course and I
shall try not to delay it too long.

;f{J,. ~ .

''1 .

arch 21, 1973

Re: No. 71-1336 - In re Griffiths
ear Harry and Bill:
This refers to your notes circulated March 22 and 23, respectively,
as to holding Griffiths until the Sugarman opinion is ready.
I write to confirm that this is entirely agreeable. By all means
take as much time as you wish.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference

j

.Ju.pumt <!}ltltrl ltf tlrt ~b .Jtattg
..-u£ri:nghtn. ~. <!}. 2ll.;t'!"
CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

April12, 1973

Re: No. 71-1336- In reApplication of Fre Le Poole
Griffiths for Admission to the Bar

Dear Lewis:
At Conference I had sufficient reservations
on this that I recorded a tentative vote to affirm.

I

have done some further study and conceivably I may
join on a limited basis.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

I will act soon.

~ttttt

<ijlmrl ltf tltt ~b .itat.ts
JI'Mlfingt:Olt. ~. <ij. 2.ll~J!.$

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

April 13, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1336

-

In re Griffiths

Dear Lewis:
Your opinion is persuasive and I am pleased
to join it.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

June 21, 1973

No. 7l-t336 4pplication of Fre I..e Poole Griffiths
for ~\dmission to the Bar
Dear Chief:
Thave now reviewed your dissenting opinion, and do
not think it calls for any changes in the Court opinion.
l' lthough we differ as to the final results, I agree with and admire - your eloquent statement on the traditional role of
the lawyer.

Sincerely,

The Chief .Justice

LFP/gg
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No. 71-1336- Application of Fre Le Poole Griffiths
for Admission to the Bar

--==-----~

~~
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.
I agree generally with Mr. Justice Rehnquist 1 s dissent and add
a few observations.
In the rapidly shrinking "one world" we live in there are

numerous reasons why the states might appropriately consider relaxing
some of the restraints on the practice of professions by aliens.

The

fundamental factor, however, is that the states reserved, among other
powers, that of regulating the practice of professions within their own
borders. If that concept has less validity now than in the 18th Century
when it was made part of the "bargain" to create a federal union, it is
nonetheless part of that compact.
A large number of American nationals are admitted to the
practice of law in more than a dozen countries; this will expand as
world trade enlarges.

.

..

~

~~et!~~ nQhnquis~

CC:ir¥Ct8.~itf(RF:

.

.:]

But the question for the Court is not what is

I

- 2 -

enlightened or sound policy but rather what the Constitution and its
Amendments provide; I am unable to accord to the Fourteenth Amendment the expansive reading the Court gives it.
In recent years the Court, in a rather casual way, has articulated
the code phrase "suspect classifications" as though it embraced a reasoned
constitutional concept. Admittedly, it simplifies judicial work as do
"per se" rules, but it tends to stop analysis while appearing to suggest
an analytical process.
Much as I agree with some aspects of the policy implicit in the
Court's holding, I am bound -- if I apply the Constitution as its words
and intent speak to me -- to reject the good policy the Court now adopts.
I am unwilling to accept what seems to me a denigration of the
posture and role of a lawyer as an "officer of the court." It is that role
that a state is entitled to rely on as a basis for excluding aliens from
the practice of law.

By virtue of his admission a lawyer is granted what

can fairly be called a monopoly of sorts; he is granted a license to appear
and try cases; he can cause witnesses to drop their private affairs and
be called for depositions and other pre-trial processes that, while subject
to the ultimate control of the court, are conducted by lawyers outside
courtrooms; the enormous power of cross-examination of witnesses is
granted exclusively to lawyers.

Inherent in these large powers is the

ability to compel answers subject, of course, to such limiting restraints

' ·~·rr:

- 3 -

as the Fifth Amendment and rules of evidence.

In most states a lawyer

is authorized to issue subpoenas commanding the presence of persons
and even the production of documents under certain circumstances.

The

broad monopoly granted to lawyers is the authority to practice a profession
and by virtue of that to do

things other citizens may not lawfully do.

In the common law tradition the lawyer becomes the attorney -- the agent
for a client only by virtue of his having been first invested with power
by the state, usually by a court.

The lawyer's obligations as an officer of

the court permite the court to call on the lawyer to perform duties which
no court could order citizens generally, including the obligation to
observe codes of ethical conduct not binding on the public generally.
The concept of a lawyer as an officer of the court and hence part
of the official mechanism of justice in the sense of other court officers,
including the judge, albeit with different duties, is not unique in our
system but it is a significant feature of the lawyer's role in the common
law.

This concept has sustained some erosion over the years at the

hands of cynics who view the lawyer much as the "hired gun" of the
Old West.

In less flamboyant terms the lawyer in this relation to the

client came to be called a "mouth piece" in the gangland parlance of the
1930's.

Under this bleak view of the profession the lawyer, once engaged,

does his client's bidding, lawful or not, ethical or not.

.'
- 4 Whatever the erosion of the officer-of-the-court role, the
overwhelming proportion of the legal profession rejects both the
denigrated role of the advocate and counselor that renders him a lackey
to the client and the alien idea that he is an agent of government.

See

American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function
and the Defense Function, § 1. 1 (1970).
The role o£ a lawyer as an officer of the court predates the
Constitution; it was carried over from the English system and became
firmly embedded in our tradition.
to client.

It included the obligation of first duty

But that duty never was and is not today an absolute or un-

qualified duty.

It is a first loyalty to serve the client's inte.rest but

always within-- never outside --the law, thus placing a heavy personal
and individual responsibility on the lawyer.

That this ' is often unenforceable,

that departures from it remain undetected, and that judges and bar
associations have been singularly tolerant of misdeeds of their brethren,
renders it no less important to a profession that is increasingly crucial
to our way of life.

The very independence of the lawyer from the

government on the one hand and client on the other is what makes the
law a profession, something apart from trades and vocations in which
obligations of duty and conscience play a lesser part.

It is as crucial

to our system of justice as the independence of judges themselves.

- 5 -

The history of the legal profession is filled with accounts of
lawyers who risked careers by asserting their independent status in
opposition to popular and govermnental attitudes, as John Adams did in
Boston to defend the soldiers accused in what we know in our folklore as
the "Boston Massacre."

To that could be added the lawyers who defended

John Peter Zenger and down to lawyers in modern times in cases such as
Johnson v. Zerbst.

JJ

The crucial factor in all these cases is that the

advocates performed their dual role -- officer of the court and advocate
for a client -- strictly within and never in derogation of high ethical
standards.

There is thus a reasonable, rational basis for a state to

conclude that persons owing first loyalty to this country will grasp these
traditions and apply our concepts more than those who seek the benefits
of American citizenship .while declining to accept the burdens of citizenship
in this country.
In some countries the legal system is so structured that all
lawyers are literally agents of govermnent and as such bound to place
the interests of govermnent over those of the client.

That concept is

so alien to our system with an independent bar that I find it difficult
to see how nationals of such a country, incalcated with those ideas and

Jj
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.

- 6at the same time unwilling to accept American citizenship, could be
properly integrated to our system. At the very least we ought not
stretch the Fourteenth Amendment to force the states to accept any
national of any country simply because of a recital of the required oath
and passing of the bar examination.
Since the Court now strikes down a power of the states accepted
as fundamental since 1787, even if states sometimes elected not to
exercise it, cf. Bradwell v. The State , 16 Wall. 130

(1872),

the states may well move ·to adopt, by statute or rule of court, a
reciprocal proviso, familiar in other contexts; under such a reciprocal
treatment of applicants a state would admit to the practice of law the
nationals of such other countries as admit American citizens to
practice.

I find nothing in the core holding of Zschering v. Miller,

389 U.s. 429 (1967), to foreclose state adoption of such reciprocal
provisions.

See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503.

,.._ . ...-

. .,.,.. ...

lfp/ss 6/22/73
No. 71-1336 In re Griffiths
This case comes to us on appeal from the Supreme Court
of Connecticut. The question which it presents is whttther a state
may refuse to admit resident aliens to the practice of law without
violating the Equal Pr<teetion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Appellant, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United
States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she married aU. s.
citizen and became a resident of Connecticut. After her graduation
from law school in 1970, she applied for permissioo. to take the
Bar Exam, and was found qualified in all respects except that she
was not a citizen of the United States. For this reason, her
application was denied.
Our cases have established that any law which discriminates
against resident alleDB must be scrutinized strictly to insure that
the state's diseriminatioo. is supported by a strmg justification.
In the present ease, there is no question as to Connecticut's

substantial interest 1n assuring that its licensed lawyers possess
the requisite professional and character quallficatloos. No

..

2.
question is raised as to appellant's possessing these
qualifications.
The sole issue is whether alienage alone is a valid grourd
for discriminatory treatment. We conclude that it is not. There
is no reason to believe that an alien lawyer validly residing in
this country will be less mindful of his professional responsibilities
to the courts and clients than other lawyers. All persons
licensed to practice law in a state are subject to the same
regulations and the same standards of Professional Conduct.
We reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Connecticut.
The Chief Justice filed a dissenting in which Mr. Justice
Rehnquist joined. Mr. Justice Rehnquist :tlsdfiled a dissenting
opinion.
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of Connecticut. The question which it presents is whether a state
may refuse to admit resident aliens to the practice of law without
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Appe,llant, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United
States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she married a U.S.
citizen and became a resident of Connecticut. After her graduation
from law school in 1970, she applied for permission to take the
Bar Exam, and was found qualified in all respects except that she
was not a citizen of the United States. For this reason, her
application was denied.
Our cases have established that any law which discriminates
against resident aliens must be scrutinized strictly to insure that
the state's discrimination is supported by a strong justification.
In the present case, there is no question as to Connecticut's

substantial interest in assuring that its licensed lawyers possess
the requisite professional and character qualifications. No

<

•

2.
question is raised as to appellant's possessing these
qualifications.
The sole issue is whether alienage alone is a valid grourd
for discriminatory treatment. We conclude that it is not. There
is no reason to believe that an alien lawyer validly residing in
this country will be less mindful of his professional responsibilities
to the courts and clients than other lawyers. All persons
licensed to practice law in a state are subject to the same
regulations and the same Standards of Professional Conduct.
We reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Connecticut.
The Chief Justice filed a dissenting in which Mr. Justice
Rehnquist joined. Mr. Justice Rehnquist al lUf filed a dissenting
opinion.
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JUSTICE WILLI A M H . REHNQUIST

June 22, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1336 - Application of Fre Le Poole Griffiths
for Admission to the Bar

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

The Chief Jus t ice
Copies to the Conference
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No. 71-1336 In re Griffiths
I

This case comes to us on appeal from the Supreme Court
I

may refuse 4 o admit resident aliens to the practice of
violating the Equal Protection

la~without

Clause , ~-eent~

Ap¢.llant, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United
States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she married a U.S.
I

citizen and became a resident of Connecticut.

After her graduation

from law school in 1970, she applied for permission to take the

found!\~in all respects except that she

Bar Exam, and was

was not a citizen of the United States.

For this reason, her

application was denied.
Our cases have establishecyfhat any law which discriminates
against resident alieno/must be scrutinized strict10o insure that
the state's discrimination is supported by a strong justification.
In the present case, there is no question as to Connecticut's
i

substantial interest in assuring that its licensed lawyer possess
the requisite professional and character qualifications. No

2.
question is raised as to appellant's possessing these
qualifications.
The sole issue/ is whether alienage alomy is a valid grourrl
for discriminatory treatment. We conclude that it is not.

There

is no reason to believe that an alien lawyer/ validly residing in
lh'- ~

this countryJwm ; : less mindful of his. professional responsibilities/
to the courts and client( than other lawyers.

All persons

licensed to practice law in a state are subject to the same
regulations/and the same Standards of Professional Conduct.
(},;.. --re~

a-/-o:f!iu'). J

We reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of

"-

Connecticut.
~

The Chief Justice filed a dissenting in which Mr. Justice
J\

Rehnquist joined. Mr. Justice Rehnquist also filed a dissenting
opinion.
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the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment

on the qualifications

which a State may require for admission to the
bar.

Appellant Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen

of the Netherlands, came to the United States in
1965, originally as a visitor.

In 1967, she married

a citizen of the United States and became a resident

CD

of Connecticut.

After her graduation from law school,

she applied in 1970 for permission to take the
Connecticut bar examination.

The bar association

found her qualified in all respects save that she

that acc . .ount refused to allow her to take the
Jod(~,,;f

examination.

JS

She then sought relief G
I\

SF SL:
-

on the ground that the regulation was

unconstitutional.

Her claim was rejected first

by the Superior Court and . . ultimately by the
Connecticut Supreme Court,

I'-

~

Conn, '- 'f'l

)

(197'J.),
We noted probable jurisdiction,

LfO 6

u.s. Cf

:J. 9 'I 1/. ;;J OZ.Rj

6'

and now hold that the regulation unconstitutionally
discriminates against resident

aliens.~

( I 9 7 ~).1

Griffiths, page two.

I.
We begin by sketching the background against

S'+cde ..Ct{r Cxan:,n,;. Co ~~-r ,~i· 1fe~ a.pp•/~t!!
;;:

preclusion of aliens from the practice of law.
It has long been established that a resida"-t
alien is a "person" within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's directive that a state
must not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
v, Hopkins, 118

u.s.

356, 369(1886),

E.g., Yick Wo
While

Congress has wide power to regulate immigration
and naturalization,
States, 149

u.s.

~·,

Fong Yue Ting v, United

698(1893), a

lawfully~admitted

resident ~ ien is in most respects a full member
of our society and must, under the Constitution,
be treated as such.

Indeed, as the Court recently

held,
"classifications based on alienage, like those
based on nationality or race, are inherently
suspect and subject to strict judicial scruti~n."
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S, 365, 371-372(19/1)

'

.

iP,.&J

Griffiths, page three,
The genera l principles regarding the rights
of resident aliens under the Equal Protection Clause
have found application in a number of cases invo~ing
State laws interfer• ing with the efforts of res~ent
aliens to earn a livelihood ,

In Y~k Wo v . Hopkins,

supra, this Court invalidated a municipal ordinance
regulating the operation of laundties, on the ground
that the ordinance was discriminator~y enforced
against Chinesea operators.

Several decades later ,

the Court struck down an Arizona statute which
emp laye r s
d.!!!£ ICE

s

+Ito.~

of

I7

I

{)~e

J

· -·

employ eighty per cent

7

"qualified electors or native-born citiz• ens
of the United States or some sub-divi• sion thereof,"
Truax v. Raich, 239
As

u.s.

J·~llliiiiJ

(1915).

state~the Court . . . by Mr. Chief Justice

Hughes:
"It requires no' argument to show that the right
to work for a living in the common occupations of
the community is of the very essence of the
personal freedom and opportunity that it was
the purpose of the _L rourteenthl Amendment
to secure.
lCitations omitteg]. If this
could be refused solely upon the ground of
race or nationality , the prohibition of the
denial of equal protection of the laws would
be a barren form of words," 239 u.s., at 41.

"' .•.

Griffiths, page four.
On similar reasoning, finally, the Courtr ruled
unconstitutional a California statute barring issuance
of commercial fishing licenses to persons "ineligible
to citizenship", Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,
334

u.s.

410(1948),

To be sure, the course of decisions protecting
the employment rights of resident ali .s has not
been an unbrokaen one,

u.s.

In Crane v. New York, 239

195(1915), a statute prohibiting the employment

of aliens on

p~ublic

works projects was upheld

over an equal protection challenge, apparently
on the theory that the state might constitutionally
favor citizens over aliens in the distribution of
limited resources., in that case a limited number
of job openings,
supra, 403

u.s.,

As exp~ined in Graham v. Richardson,
at 372-374, however, that

theory was repudiated by implication in Takahashi
v, Fish & Game Comm'

to favor citizens in the allocation of emplo.yment

~(no lo•lt!'r s_ert~e,U

opportunit~

t ggp ~as an adequate jus~fication

for discrimination against resident aliens,

.. .

•
Gr•ffiths,
page five.

triiiii. . .IJ!ti!IIIIIB•••:IIkn.,.
t h e St a t e may no_;;]
~
-~ practice
or mandate employ~ent discrimination against resident
a..s
e v:- e ro.( J~K o.-fter:
aliens, the special role of the attorney justifies

excludin~from the practice of 1~~. ..-~~

-fire:= ~M~ tl~e
In Connecticut, BiliW 7 3 a 11 pointS out, the

maxim that an attorney is an "officer of the court"
is given concrete meaning by a statute which makes
every attorney admitted to prafctice a "commissioner
of the Superior Court". As such, an attorney has authority
to "sign writs, issue subpoenas, take recognizances, and
administer oaths" 9

Conn. Gen. Stat • .§51-85 1 and,

.
\ +0/
in so do1ng, •
• command the assistance of a
11 , Gc". Si(d, §'J .;> - c;o , 1
county sheriff or town constable, Because of
these and other powersp

Griffiths, page six.

"The courts not only demand their loyalty,
confidence and respect but also require them
to function in a mannerfwhich will foster
public ccnfidence in the profession and, consequently,
the judicial system," I ' :2.. Conn,, at 2';1~;2~
-:lctlf lloJct o.r;;...g? .
It is undisputed that Connect:::but "has a
legitimate interest in determining whether [i.n
applican~

has the qualities of character and

professional competence requisite to the practice
of law" {Baird v.

gf ate Bar of A;: izona, 401 u.s.

1 , 7 ( 1971 ) (opinion of Black, J, ) ,
it is too late

••••IIJI

By the same token, 1-~ ''?A..J
to suggest that

the standards for admission to the bar are not
subject to constitutional constraints,

~~Y

qual-

ification must have a rational connection with the
applicant 0 s fitness or capacity to practice law",
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353

u.s.

232,239

( 1957), and may not be "invidiously discriminatory".
Id,, at 239,

Griffiths, page seven,
No claim is made that
(llCJC

11 51 resident aliens

j Fmrf

as a class lack theAcompetence or ..._.......
{Jr

..flt.e

tr-a e--fr"Ce eotF locU.

of distingulilshing betweef n citizens and resident

aliens,~ras~the

citizen's undivided

comrnittment to this county with the resident alien°s
possible conflict of
.fire

Ill

loyalties,

From thi~t&. . . ._.,_.Gb~~

C~tfe~

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • concludes that a resident
alien attorney might in the exercise of her
functions ignore her responsibilities to the courts
and her clients in favor of the interests of a foreign
power.
We find this

dang~

a.-r;emote and unreal one.

~Co_,., .'f!e-<t/
' ad 7 make.s no con•vincing demonstration
t

that the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities
(, ihf~re.s fs /

adversely to affect the .
States,

g

;Ilk; of the United

It in no way denigrates the attorney's

high responsibilities to observe that the powers
"to sign writs,•llll• issue

s~bpoenas,

take

recognizances, and administer oaths" are il'• • • •
customary ......................ll.a

concomita~ts

of

the practice of law rather than matters of state,

·.

Griffiths, page eight.

\.Cnw.mt-H e>t!:-/

Nor has the ~shown the relevance of citizenship
to the likelihood that an attorney will protect faithfully

\he .t./

the interests of -..r clients.
Even

\;;[flc:: CoTk~'ff~

were/

if ~ ontention~

treated

as having demonstrated that some residert: aliens
may be unsuited for the practice of law, •

that would be no justification for a wholesale ban.

({ l ~ C-,.,;1fee/
(FEZ?

~ alls our attention to Pearl Assurance Co.,

Ltd. v. Harrington, 38 F,Supp. 411(D.Mass,), aff 0 d
per curiam 313

u.s.

549(1941), which upheld the

constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute barring
aliens from positions as resident managers of alien
insu•rance companies doing business in Massachusetts.
While the Court's summary disposition in Pearl
does not afford insight into the grounds of
its decision, the affimtance was presumably based
on an analysis most fully
Dekebach, 274

u.s.

el~orated

392(1927).

in Clarke v.

There, the Court was

faced with a challenge to a city ordinance prohibiting
the issuance to aliens of licenses to operate pool
and billiard rooms.

Griffiths, page nine.
Characterizing the business as one having "harmful
and vicious tendf\tcies", the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the ordinances
"It was d1\gpetent for the city to make such
a choi• ce, n~ shown to be irrational, by excluding
from the conduct of a dubious business an
entire class rather than its objectioa nable
• members selected by more empirical methods."
274 u.s., at 397.
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimination
against resident aliens in a wide variety of
occupations,

0

Af least after Graham v. Richardson, supra,
such reasoning is no longer sufficient to
justify discrimination against aliens.

It is of

the essence of "strict judicial scrutiny", 403

u.s.,

at 372, that a State must where possible

use "empirical methods" rather than broad proscriptions
to separate the qualified from the untqualified.

Griffiths, page ten,
In the present context, Connecticut has
wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-case basis the
fitness of an applicant to practice law,
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate
training and familiarity with Connecticut law,
Apart from such

'8i£Wfia

.Gz

of competence,

tii•••~•·••rn~ requires Labi

I

1

I

1

If-

a

new attorney to take both ana "attorney's oath"

..._..,_"~s...-........~...,._.1_"_1 to perform her

®

functions faithfully and honestly and a "Commissbner's
oath" to "support the/onstitution of the United
States,

and the fonstitution of Connecticut".

• • • • Appellant has indicated
the

7

and
~

oAa,.tt c fe

may quite properly conduct

.

nvestigation to

insure in any given case
"that an applicant is not one who 'swears to
an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting
his disagreement with or indifference to the
oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385

u.s .

116, 132," Law

Students Research Council v, Wadmond, •'li?il?• • •
t

1l

supra, 401

u.s.,

at 164.

(!)

Griffiths, page eleven.
And once admitted to the bar, as the cases cited by
the Committee

amply demonstrate, attorneys are

~

subject to di• scipline of abuse of their powers.

a

2

2 t·

7
I

I

~

mr et

In sum, the 6ommittee has simply not established
that it must exclude all aliens from the practice of
law in order to vi• ndicate

its undoubted interest

in high professional standards.

Griffiths, page twelve.

III.
In its brief, the Examinrg Committee makes another,
quite different argument in support of Section
8(1). Appellee's arief, p. ID

Its thrust is not

that resident aliens lack the attributes necessary
to maintaint high standards in the legal profession,
but rather that
alm~ st

attorneys must be citizens

as a matter of definition.

The argument builds upon the exclusion of
aliens from the franchis in all fifty states
and their disqualification under the Constitution
from holding office as President, Art. 2, §1,cl, 4,
or as a member of the Me. . . . . . House of Representatives,
Art,

1, ~ 2,

cl, 2, or of the Senate, Art, 1,J3, cl, 3,

These and

constitutional

provisions reflect, the Committee contends, a
pervasive recognition that "participation in the
government structure as voters axnd office holders",
Appellee's Brief, p, 11, is

in~pably an

aspect of citizenship.
W• hatever the merits of thxis view in other
contexts, we are satisfied that the attorney does

Griffiths, page thirteen.
not occupy a position so close to the core of the
political process as to warrant the exclusion of aliens.
The attorney as attorney neither selects those who will
set governmental policy no• r sets it herself.

The

practice of law does of course impinge upon the
political process braadly conceived, but notwithstanding
the powers conferred by custom and law, the attorney
is prncipally the representative of her clients.
Accordingly, we hold that Section 8(1) violates
the Equal Protection Clause.

The judgment of the

Connecticut Supreme Court is reversed, and the case
is . . . remanded for further proceedings not
inconsist. ,ent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE ONE.

I

Appellant is eligible for naturalization

by reason of her marriage to a citizen of the United
States and residence in the United States for
more than three _. years, 8

u.s.c.

~1430(a),

She has not filed a declaration of intent to become
a citizen of the United States, 8

u.s.c.

Sl44S(f),

and has no present intention of doing so.

r

5

Appellant's Srief, ~ p. 4.
In order to become a citizen, appellant would
be required to renounce her J ' I citizenship
of the Netherlands.

8 U.S .c.§ 1448(a).

FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE ONE.

~

The rule was first promulgated in 1879.

~ Application of Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249,~3,

294 A. 2d ;).81, ;;63 ( 1972).

-

Before that time,

admitted to practice on the same basis as citizens.

FOOTNTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE ONE
Because we find that the rule denies equal protection,
we do not reach appellant's other claims.

FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE FIVE,

1

Appellant denies that this was

State's purpose

ia

s

z·

7

\~~he

in .__.._~_.._. .~....--~......

2

requiring citizenship for the practice of law,
•

noting citizenship is also required . - .

........ of practic. . ioners in other fields,
including haridressers and cosmeticians, Conn,
Gen. Stat, §20-250, architects,
~

Conn, Gen. Stat.

20-291, and sanitarians, Conn, Gen. Stat•.§ 20-361.

Because we dispose of the case on other grounds,
we do not consider this claim,

FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS , PAGE NINE .

~

See cases collected at Note , Constitutionality

of Restrictions on Aliens ' Rt ight to Work , 57
Columbia Law Review 1011 2 , 1021 - 1023(1957)•( M~ ('~5 -!,;cltoiu

.soft- df',"hks

+o

J~lrfh,'}l r(J t/,).
in 1946 is shown by M• . Konvitz, The Alien and the
Asiatic in American Law 190-211(1946).

FOGrNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE TEN.
/

~

ltext L
The'- IIJf the ~ttO*rney's oath-fs as followsa
You solemnly swear that you will do no falsehood, nor
consent to any to be done in court, and, if you know of any
to be done, you will give information thereof to the judges,
or one of them, that it may be reformed; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue or cause to be sued, any
false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or consent, to the same;
you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but will exercise
the office of attorney, within the court wherein you may
practice, according to the best of your learning and discretion, and with fidelity, as well to the court as to your client,
so held you God.

J.s',App,, p, 44,

FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE TEN

7

Because the /mmissioner 's oath is an oath

to "support the constitution of the United States,
and the constitution of ....M Connecticut, so long
as you continue to be a citizen thereofl "e ,L'emphasis
addec!7, appellant could not of course take the oath

± sg· E ?Zt as prescribed,

To the extent that the

..................~~. . . . . . oath

7 ·

RP

---~~~~~--• reiterates' f"k .! f8(1 ) 's
citizenship requirement, it shares the
constitutional

defe~ t ~

members of the bar,

same

f' "- 9Ut~eJ o-fl /
when\ II 5
I r-""ProJ'speci\!:ve
3

1

I

FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE TEN.
find no merit in the contention
that only citizens can in good
an • oath to support

&&

consc•i~nce

take

ILL the Constitution.
t

We note

;

;

I

aliens,

10

inducted into the

to take the 4

(following 1
· 7'577'.

M

u.s.c.

502

oath•••••••-

"I, ---·········································' do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers
appointed over me, according to regulations and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God."

i';)J

\aliens'
If t·
ca
making use

I

5

•z:

ake this oath when the nation is

of~ervices

in the national defense,

\resident alie~ applican;r
1&
ant l ££
-for admission to the
70

••

bar can surely • • • • • • • • not W 2 n 2 1 1 a be
olo ts
an oath to support the Constitutio~~

~1t~
on the theory they cannod&

-I'J..,

o•-IV

rin good faith.

FOOTNOT. E TO

I'

Jll GRIFFITHS, PAGE ELEVEN

Appellee's Brief, pp.

20-21 (~ citing,~

Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316(1879)),

.J

No. 1336 - Griffiths
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a novel question

the constraints

imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
on the qualifications which a State may require for admission to the
bar. Appellant, Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen

~

o~Netherlands,

came

to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she
married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of

1/
Connecticut.-

Mter her graduation from law school, she applied in

1970 for permission to take the Connecticut bar examination. The
bar association found her qualified in all respects save that she was
not a citizen of the United States , as required by Rule 8(1) of the
2/ ~

Connecticut Practice Book (1963), - ._.on that account refused to
A

J'(

allow her to take the examination. She then sought judie ial relief. •

.

~

~~
-11111
that the regulation was unconstitutionaL Her claim was
)\

Ills••••

rejected first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the Connecticut
Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d 281 (1972). We noted
probable jurisdiction, 406 U.S. 966 (1972), and now hold that the

3/
regulation unconstitutionally discriminates against resident aliens.-

I.

-).-

We begin by sketching the background against which the State
Bar Examing Committee, appellee here, attempts to justify the total

r

~elusion of aliens from the practice of law

It has long been established that the national government has ''broad

constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to

-a

1 a./l.. -1-t:. · ,

':iJ

the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their
)...

conduct before naturalization.. .

" Takahashi v. Fish & Game Q

Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 66 (1941); fiJifl Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
But a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the
meaning of the • • • Fourteenth Amendment's directive that a
state must not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the g
equal protection of the laws."
U.S. 356, 369 (1886).

~- ~·,

z

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118

Indeed, it is now settled law that a resident

alien/ is in most respects a full member of our society subject to
duties as well ·as being entitled to most of the rights of citizenship.
· As noted in -Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971),

aliens pay taxes, contribute to the economy, may serve
:i:H

in the armed forces, and may well be long-term residents.

under the Equal Protection Clause have found application in a number

1

- 3 -

of cases involving state laws interfering with the efforts of resident
aliens to earn a livelihood. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, this Court
invalidated a municipal ordinance regulating the operation of laundries)on the ground that the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against
Chinese operators. Several decades later, the Court struck down an
Arizona statute which required employers of more than five persons to
employ eighty percent "qualified electors or native-born citizens of
the United States or some sub-division thereof." Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915). As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes:
"It requires no argument to show that the right

to work for a living in the common occupations
of the community is of the very essence of the
personal freedom and opportunity that it was
the purpose of the LF"ourteenthJ Amendment
to secure. /Citations omitted. 7 If this could
be refused solely upon the ground of race or
nationality, the prohibition of the denial of
equal protection of the laws would be a barren
form of words." 239 U.S. , at 41.
On similar reasoning ;..Q
.

v

I gg ' the Court ruled unconstitutional a
"

California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to

-4-

persons "ineligible to citizenship". Takahashi v. Fish

u.s.

and Game Comm'n, 334

410(1948).

Te be sure, the course of

decisio~

protecting

the employment rights of resident aliens has not been
an unswerving one.

'+

In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U.S. 392(1927),

the Court was faced with a challenge to a city ordinance
prohibiting the issuance to aliens of l - icenses to operate
pool and billiard rooms.

Characterizing the business

as one having "harmful and vici•ous tendencies", the
Court found no constitutional infirmity in the
ordinance a
"It was competent for the city to make such
a choice, not shown to be irrational, by
excluding from the conduct of a dubiousE
business an entire class rather than its
objectionable members ~ selected by
more empirJIIit ical methods." 274 u.s., at 397.
This easily

expand ~ ble

proposition supported

discrimination against resident aliens in a wide
range of occupations.
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke
were undermined in Takahashi, where the Court stated
that "the pofWer of a state to apply its laws
exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class
is confif ned within narrow limits." 334

u.s.,

at 420.

\{urthe~~
~r

Indeed, subsequent decisions have moved even . .
in requiring "empirical methods", holding thata

v ··f

The Court has contsistently emphasized that
a State which adopts a suspect classification "bears
a heavy burden of justification", McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379

u.s.

184, 196(1964), a burden which ,

though variously formulated, requires the State
to meet certain standards of proof,

In order to

justify the use of a suspect classification ,
a State must show that its pxur_pose or interest
is both

~
/le"At;~s/blet• 7and
constitutionally 1
.

~

substantLal, and that its use of the classification
is

"nece~ary

to the accomplishment"of its purpose/

or the safeguarling of its interest.

6.
II.

We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the state,
has not carried its heavy burden of justification.

The State's

ultimate interest here implicated is to assure the requisite
10
qualifications of persons licensed to practice law.

It is

undisputed that a state has a legitimate and substantial interest
in determining whether an applicant possesses "the character and
general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law. "
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159
(1970).

See also Konigsberg v. state Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 40-41

~

(1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239
11

(1956).

But no question is raised in this case as to appellant's

character or general fitness.

Rather, the sole basis for disqualification

is her status as a resident alien.
The Committee defends Rule 8 (1) 's requirement that
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the United states
on the ground that the special role of the lawyer justifies excluding
alients from the practice of law. In Connecticut, the Committee
points out, the maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court"

7

is given concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer a
"commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a lawyer has authority
to "sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, administer oaths and
take depositions and acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85.
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer may command the

assistance of a county sheriff or a town constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-90.

{~.12--,'-:L;~
"the courts not only demand tfte.H! loyalty, conA

fidence and respect, but also require them to
function in a manner which will foster public confidence in the profession and, consequently, the
judicial system." 162 Conn. at 262-263, 294
A. 2d, at 287.

•

.I

-

In order to establish a link between citizenship and
the powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in
Connecticut, the Committee contrasts a citizen's
undivided allegiance to this country with
a resident alien's possible conflict of loyalties.
From this, the Comittee conclude«s that a resident alien lawyer

might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the
'-"oftofl«

even his clients

J:n" favor of the interest of a foreign power.I

We find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way denigrates a
lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that the powers "to sign writs
and subpoenas, take recognizances, ["angl administer oaths" hardly involve matters of state policy or acts of such ~RQ£
as to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that the practice of
law offers meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interest of the
United States. Certainly the ommittee has failed to show the relevance
of citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to protect faithfully
the interest of his clients.

Nor would the possibility that some resident

'1

aliens are unsuited to the practice of law be a
justification for a wholesale ban.

This constitutional warning is especially salient where,
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explicit
use of a suspect classification.

Although, as we

have ack~wledged, • a State
\_. ) does have a substantial interest in the qualifications of those admitted to

the practice of law, the arguments advanced by the f'ommittee fall short
of showing that the classification established by Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut
Practice Book (1963)

isr:A~c:n&l>II_
.Jllnecessary
l(!'~~·~j

to the promoting or safeguard-

nqual~onnecticut has wide freedom to gauge

<'

I O,

on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training and familiarity
with Connecticut law. Apart from such tests of competence, it requires
a new lawyer to take both an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions

1-J
faithfully and honestly.*' and a "commissioner's oath" to "support the
Constitution of the United States , and the Constitution of Connecticut."' :

.,'

1

'I

Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the
substance of both oaths,

and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a

character investigation to insure in any given case "that an applicant is
not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting
his disagreement with or indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385
U.S. ll6, 132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra,

If/.

401 U.S., at 164. · Moreover, once admitted to the bar, lawyers are subject
to continuing scrutiny by the organized bar and the courts. In addition
to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-admission

If

I

sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions

1151

~

and disbarment.

•

In sum , the Committee simply has not established that

it must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order to vindicate
its undoubted interest in high professional standards.

j.

L

,,

•:

.

III.
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, quite

~ule
different argument in support of 8

8(1).

'

L

?1

• a
I

-

I

I

g
;

Pi 1-..

Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes necessary to
I

t

I

1fc.cwyer&J

hi h

mam am 1g standards in the legal profession, but rather that}f

J?-USt be citizens almost as a m_atter of definition. ;1!f!l' ,r-Ae
tlf?pl/ct.\ftti., 01-fJ -rltis aYta f ysl..s ;·s
flra-1- excfv.s 1 ~"1 0 .(' Ot/,'~I?S
ff-o.,.. .fit@ · l7cJ.I pro*SS'ra,ziJ /s
n.o ·l £"u4;'c=>c:f 7& 4-"Y

~cv-uf,-n.y

u..-d-er +~tr:.. Etval

The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from the

franchi~\n all fifty States and their disqualification under the Con-

"

stitution from holding office as President, Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a
member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the
Senate, Art. 1, § 3, cl. 3. These and myriad other federal and state
statutory and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee contends,
a pervasive recognition that "participation in the government structure

••••t

as voters and office holders~#~'~,•••••••Ft•i
an aspect of

L

citizensh~p.

is inescapably

e'~

,

/?

Offered in support of the _._.. . . . claim
that the

\(41.v'
'/ LS
.
~
-y e ¥

an

II

•
o ff"Lce h o ld er II Ln
t h"Ls

sense is an enhanced version of the proposition ,
discussed above, that he is an "officer of the court",
Specifica~

the Committee states that

/a..~.Vyer
the

It l 1

1£ "is an officer of the court who acts

by and with the authority of the statef " and
is entrusted with the "exercise of actual
Qower".

governmen~

Appellee's "Brief._ n _ S .

We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond the
opmion of the Connecticut Supre~e

.~ ,..,,.f

I

~

c::tl'\

C

t which recognized that

ou~ '

o{l-t,ca,... '" -f 4e

o('clt'na"'/ ~et1S~ ..,

..
¥ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .

1b ::l
...r I

.

1 fii£.

..L

co vYt pcrr ':s

CVt

"f- J.

(

'« A

Co11 n, ~ 7

.:; S

'1; 'J- 9 'I AJ~ a."t ;;~s.

1-t..J._
o-1 1-W-. -~
cwr . ~:+:i, zl, J"jj s-F'
Pt

~ ~~-4 ~ ~~~4~./ t',. ... ; tM__,
-file~? 2 7 ~ Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S.

/\
399

(1956)·i~oa "by Mr.
•

A.

Justice Black, the Court distinguished

~1...V'f:l;%em "affjc~ within the eonventional-meaning of t-hat teru£'5
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are

I officers of the court. I
One of the most Q a
frequently repeated statements to this effect appears
in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court
pointed out there, however, that an attorney was not
an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term.
Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland
or in any other case decided by this Court places
attorneys in the same category
as marshals,
bailiffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials
a lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important
though it be to our system of justice. In general he
makes his own decisions, follows his own best
judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own
business. The word 'officer' a~ as it has

~----------------~·

Jd : - / y -

always been applied to lawyers conveys a different
meaning from the word 'officer' as applied to people
serving as officers within the conventional meaning
W {1o 'ho ~ oM/7/~J].
of that term." 3[ 2! '3
3. ~a

ut

{,.J f/..1-

'-l o,s-

.·

~lndeed occupy professional positions of

J

responsibility and influence that impose on them duties correlative
with their vital right of access to the courts.
-

----

)

~"""------------

Moreover, by virture of their professional aptitudes

.

and natural interestts,

~ta.~y

e7t:

.5

have been leaders in

government throughout the history of our . . country,
Y~,they

are not officials of government by virture of

being~Nor does the status of holding
a license to practice law place one so close to the

,,

core of the political process as to make him a ..lllllllk
formulator of government policy,

- - - - - - - -·____:J

1

-ts-A~ ~

hold that Section 8{1) violates the Equal

Protection Claus-!. OThe judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES
1. Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her
marriage to a citizen of the United states and residence in the
United states for more than three years, 8 U. S.C.
has not filed a declaration of

§

1430(al. She

~ become a citizen of the United

inten~to

I

states, 8 U.S. C.

§

1445(f), and has no present intentio of doing so.

Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Netherlands.

that time, aliens were apparently admitted to practice on the same

l

bo

f

h

/"' G, nee. :hcui

q:n

J e !sf!? w

h-ev'-t . /

•• rn 1872 this Court stated in
another context thatl the right of admission to practice
in the courts of a State
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the
United States, It has not, as far as we
know, ever been made in any State, or in any
case, to depend on citizenship at all,
Certainly many prominent and distinguished
lawyers have been admitted to practice, both
in the State and Federal courts, who were not
citizens of the United States or of any State,"
Bradwell v, The State, 16 Wall, 130, 139(1872).
3, Because we find that the rule denies
equal protection, we do not reach appellant's other
claims.
l

...

--.

4 . See also .

People v .

crane, 214 N. Y. 154 , 108 N. E. 427 , affti sub nom .
crane v . New York, 239

u.s.

195(1915); but see

gG.£r~ahh~amm_:v~.Jf!!ll'• ._,JR~i~c:J:h~a!:!r:!Jd~s~o~n , 4 0 3 U• S • , at 374 •

See cases collected at Note, Constitutionality of
Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 Columbia Law Review
1012, 1021-1023 (1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending

\

\gghtning~
of soft drinks to the selling of
, , ' rods).

The full scale

of restrictions imposed on p ] the work opportunities of aliens
in 1946 is shown by M. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in
American Law 190-211 (1946).

l

- IJJ., -

6

Although alienage is generally equated with

race as a suspect classification, we did not decide
in Graham nor do we decide here whether there might
be circumstances, such as armed hostilities between
the United States and the country of which an aliia:en
is a citizen, in which alienage would not be suspect •

..

·,

-I~-

7 ..,_
I

Discrimination or segregation for its

own sake is not, of course,a constitutionally
permissible -purpose,
Education, 347

li.J!.t Brown v. Board of

u.s . . . 483,495(1954),

McLaughlin v. Florida, supra,

~The

State interest required has been character-

ized as "overriding", McLaughlin v, Florida, 379
at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388

u.s.

1,11(1967),

"compelling", Graham v. Richardson, 403
"important", Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
or "substantial", id,

u.s.,

u.s.

at 375,

330,343(1972),

We attribute no particular

significance to these vari.ations in diction,

~McLaughlin

v. Florida, 379

Loving v. Virginia, 388

u.s.,

at 11.

u.s.,

u.s.,

at 196;

\

J~

Appellant denies that this was indeed the State's purpose

in requiring citizenship for the practice of law,

not~enship

\

l

is also required of practitioners in other fields, including hairdressers
and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat.
Gen. Stat.

\

§

§

20-250, architects, Conn.

20-291, and sanitarians, Conn. Gen. Stat.

§

20-361.

Because we dispose of the case on other grounds, we do not consider
this • • • claim.

\

1/f In this

confnection, Mr. Justice Frankfurter

wrote a

\

"From a profession charged with such responsibilities
there must Q~.exacted those qualities of truthspeaking, o~igh sense of honor, of granite
discretion, of the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout
the centuries, been compendiously described
as 'moral character'."
Schware v.
~~~~--~~Board of Bar Examiners, 353 u.s.
232,~1957)(concurring opinion).
/;)~7 \

I

3,

1~

I

Attorneys frequently represent foreign countries

and the nationals of such countries in litigation in the

l

courts of the United States, as well as in other matters
in this country.

In such representation, the duty of

the attorney, subject to his role as an"officer of the
court", is to further the interests of his clients
by all lawful means, even when those interests are in
conflict with the interests of the United States or of
a State.

But this representation involves no conflict

of interest in the invidious

~

sense.

Rather, it

casts the attorney is his homored and traditional
role as

an authorized but independent

agent acting to vindicate the legaj l rights of a client,
whoever it may be.

I

It is conceivable that an alien

licensed to practice law in this country could find

Ill

I
himself in a position where he might be called upon

l·-

to represent his country of citizenship against
h

the United States i• circumstances where there may be

!.

a conflict between his obligations to the two countries,
In such rare situations, an honorable perso~, whether
an alien or not, would decline the representation,

.,

. .

J

13
;

.._, The text of the attorney's oath is as follows:
"You solenmly swear that you will do no falsehood,
nor consent to any to be done in court, and, if you know
of any to be done, you will give information thereof to
the judges, or one of them, that it may be reformed;
you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue or cause
to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or
consent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre
or malice; but will exercise the office of attorney,
within the court wherein you may practice, according
to the best of your learning and discretion, and with
fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so
help you God.

J. S. App. , p. 44.
1 L{- ~ There is no question as to the validity of requiring an

applicant, as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such
an oath.

Law students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164.

----

-~-

.~~ Because the commissioner's oath .

~~··

the constitution of the United stat

1s an oath to "support

es, and the constitution of

f
r

Connecticut

1

' so ong as you continue to be a citizen thereof"

[emphasis added], a
as prescribed.

ppe

To the extent that the oath reiterates Rule 8( 1) 's

citizenship requirement
%eq 8

lla t
n could not of course take the oath

bt defects wh

·t
' 1 shares the same constitutional

·
en required of prospective members of the b
ar.

.

'

I

lb~

We find no merit in the contention that only citizens

can in good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution.
We note that all persons inducted into the armed services, including
resident aliens, are required by 10 U.S. C.cj 502 to take the
following oath:
"I,
, o solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance
to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the
President of the United States and the orders of the
officers appointed over me, according to regulations
and the t 5 t Uniform Code of Military Justice.
So help me God. "
If aliens can take this oath when the riation is making use of their

services in the national defense, . . . . . . . . resident alienfl
applicants for admission to the bar<§l~ surely ot be precluded,
as a class, from taking an oath to support the Constitution on
the theory they cannot take the oath in good faith.

IUJCI Jt:; pu t Sf nstss ( 8zt:Mltl ) O;'lt;'•l

,, _

~

jl. See, ~- ~·, Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316 (1879).

I

Apart from the courts, the profession itself has long subj.e cted its
members to discipline under codes or cannons of professional ethics.
As early as 1908 the American Bar Association adopted 32 Canons
of Professional Ethics.

In

1

197~lowing several years of

study and reexamination, the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association approved a new

aBe uamprehenam Code of

··Professional Responsibility, which provides detailed ethical
a.A--'

perscriptions aftd well as a comprehensive code of disciplinary rules.
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility has since been

r

approved or adopted in

states, including Connecticut.

of the American Bar Association, Vol. 97, (1972) p.

Reports

J

\

#

~othing

in our rules prohibits ' from

admission to p~ctice in this Court • resident aliens

who~een admitted • • • • • • • • • to practice
"for three years past in the highest court of a State,
Territory, District, Commonwealth, or

~IIIIII, Posses-

iorlf"and whose "private and professional characters
shall appear to be good," Rule 5, Rules of the
Supreme Court of the United States(l970).

~ Because the Committee has f a~"1 ed to establish

~~-

tha: the

~s a n " off'

~ce

holder" ' we, need not

andj do not decide whether there ;s
l
. . merit in . . ~,JYl~

~d,

Jif2r. era.

{

l

if so , to What off;ces
...
it would apply,

$.·'

' ~•

tl'• ••

.

'~

..

~D

~n a thoughtful opinion,

tge California Supreme

unconstitutional a similar California
rule.

Raffaelli v. O.ommittee of Bar Examiners,

- - - C a l , 3d_ _ _ , 496 P,2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr.
896(1972).
484 P. 2d 690(Alaska 1971).

See also Application of Park,

Rider A, p. 2 B (Griffiths) 2/11/73

It has long been established that the national government has ''broad
constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to
the United states, the period they may remain, regulation of their
conduct before naturalization, ••• " Takahashi v. Fish & Game £x:aaa:u
gomm'n.., 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.s.
52, 66 (1941 ); and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
But a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the
meaning of the :ik1adk Fourteenth Amendment's directive that a
state must not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the J11111X
equal protection of the laws."

~·

K·, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118

U.s. 356, 369 (1886). Indeed, it is now settled law that a resident
alient is in most respects a full member of our society subject to
duties as well as being entitled to most of the rights of citizenship.
As noted in ildl Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.s. 365, 376 (1971),

"aliens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed
forces", they may live within a state for many years and contribute'
significantly to its welfare and growth.

Rider A, p. 4 (Griffiths) 2/11/73

The Court in Crane also relied on the concept, since rejected, that
"whatever is a privilege rather than a right, may be made dependent
upon citizenship". Crane v. New York, suEra at 164. The doctrinal
foundation of Crane was undermined, however, IlK in 'lxbduUdrt
Takahashi,

supr~,

and it retains no force in the present eootext.

Indeed, subsequent decisions have moved signUicantly in the opposite
direction, holding that:
"ClassUications based on alienage, like those based
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny. " Graham v.
Richardson, supra at 371, 376.

(~ill:

What other eases, if any, should be cited here?)

It is thus now clear from the recent deeisioos of this Court that
resident aliens "as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete
and lw•a insular' minority. (See United states v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 u.S.

14~

.eax•••~Mw••

4c 152-153, n. 4 (1938))

for whom' [a] hightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."
Qraham,

~ra

at 372. See also Takahashi, supra at 420.

Rider A, p. 7 (Griffiths) 2/11/73

hardly involve matters of state; nor are they powers which are
likely to result in any conflict of interest with another country or
enable

theMB~

alien attorney to act to the detriment of this

country.*

*Attorneys···rrequently represent foreign countries and the nationals
of such countries in littgattcn in the courts of the United states, as
well as in other matters in this country. In such representaticns
the duties of the attorney, subject to his duty as an "officer" of the
court, are to further the interests of his client by all lawful means,
even if such interests are in ccnflict with those of the United States
or a state. Such representation involves no conflict of interest in
an invidious sense. Rather, it casts the attorney 1n his honored
and traditional role of acting as the authorized but independent agent
to vindicate the legal rights of a client, whomever it may be. Of
course, it is conceivable that an alien licensed to practice law in
this country could find himself in a position where he might be called
upon to represent his country of citizenship against the United states
in circumstances where there may be conflicts between kB his oaths
to the two countries. In such rare situations, an honorable person,
whether an alien or not, would decline the representation.

Note to Bill:
It seems to me that the "conflict of interest" possibillty needs
to be addressed a little more fully than your draft. You may think
of a better way to do it.

Also, I wanted to omit the reference to

"customary concomitants", as I think Connecticut is probably one
of few states which authorizes lawyers to sign writs and issue
subpoenas.

.·~·1 ,

~··

Rider~

p. 5 (Griffiths) 2/11/73

It is undisputed that Connecticut has a legitimate interest in

determining whether an JllppliaL applicant possesses ''the character
and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law".
Law atudents Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1970).
See also Konigsberg v. state Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 40-41 (
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 234 (
(Frankfurter,

.. ·.l,

(

.r.,

concurring) .

);
);

Rider A. p. 3 of n<tes (Griffiths) 2/11/73

7. There is no question as to the validity of requiring an
applicant, as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such
an oath. Law students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164.
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And once admitted to the bar, attorneys are subject to cootinuing
scrutiny by the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline
for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-admissioo a sanctions
extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutioos and
9

"W*hl disbarment.
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10. §ee,

~·

K·, Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316 (1879).

Apart from the courts, the profession itself has long subjected its
members to discipline under codes or cannons of professional ethics.
As early as 1908 the American Bar Association adopted 32 Canons

of Professional Ethics. In 1970( ?) , following several years of
study and reexamination, the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association approved a new and comprehensive Code of
Professional Respoosibility, which provides detailed ethical
perscriptioos and well as a comprehensive code of disciplinary rules.
The ABA Code of Professional RespoosibUity has since been
approved or adopted in

states, including Connecticut. Reports

of the American Bar Association, Vol. 97, (1972) p. _ .

Note to Bill:
I do not have the 1972 report of the ABA.

Check the library

to see whether it is available there. If not take a look at p. 676 and
677 of Volume 96 which I do have oo my shelf and which shows on
p. 677 that Connecticut was expected to adopt the Code in the
spring of 1971. If the 1973 volume is not available, call the
Washington office of the ABA and talk to Don Channell who is In
charge there. Tell him you are calling at my Jlt request and ask
him if he has a copy of the report of this Committee made to the ABA
annual t meeting last summer or possibly even the most recent report
was made this weekend at the midwinter meeting in Cleveland.

Then ask Mr. Channell to tell you what Connecticut has done and
rive vou the date

of adontinn tf Ahnwn hv 1"Ann1"t
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It is further contended that in Connecticut an attorney
" is an officer of the court who acts by and with the authority of the
state, and that - because of ''this power which he has been given" the state is concerned with the integrity of the attorney's "exercise
of actual government power".

Appelle~s

Brief p. 5.

We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond the
q>inion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which recognized that
"an attorney is 'not an officer within the ordinary meaning of that
term'". 162 Conn. at

- -•

The committee's concept of an

attorney's participatioo in "actual government power" finds no
support in fact or authority. In Cammer v. United states, 350 U.S.
399 (1956) in opinioo by Mr. Justice Black, the Court distinguished
attorneys from "officers within the conventional meaning of that term":
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are
'officers of the c rurt. ' One of the most f:a •
frequently repeated statements to this effect appears
in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court
pointed out there, however, that an attorney was not
an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term.
Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland
or in any other case decided by this Court places
attorneys tn the same category .... as marshals,
batliffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials
a lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important
though it be to our system of justice. In general he
makes his own decisims, follows his own best
judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own
business. The word 'officer' as '4twlt as tt has
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It is further contended that in Connecticut an attorney
"is an officer of the court who acts by and with the authority of the
state, and that - beeause of ''this power which he has been given"the state is concerned with the integrity of the attorney's "exercise
of actual government power". Appelle~s Brief p.

5.

We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond the
opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which recognized that
"an attorney is 'not an officer within the ordinary meaning of that
term'"· 162 Conn. at
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The committee's concept of an

attorney's participation in ''actual government power" finds no
support in fact or authority. In Cammer v. United states, 350 U.S.
399 (1956) in opinion by Mr. Justice Black, the Court distinguished
attorneys from "officers within the conventional meaning of that term":
''It has been stated many times that lawyers are
'officers of the crurt. ' One of the most :baari:
frequently repeated statements to this effect appears
in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall 333, 378. The Court
pointed out there, however, that an attorney was not
an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term.
Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland
or in any other case decided by this Court places
attorneys in the same category WN •• as marshals,
bailiffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials
a lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important
though it be to our system of justice. In general he
makes his own dectsims, follows his own best
judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own
business. The word 'officer' as :applt as it has
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It is further contended that in Connecticut an attorney
"is an officer of the court who acts by and with the authority of the
state, and that - because of ''this power which he has been given" th

tate is concerned with the int grity of the ttorney's "exercis

of actual governm nt power". Appelle4s Bri f p. 5.
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond the
q>inion of the Conn cticut Supreme Court, which r cognized that
"an attorney is 'not an offic r within the ordinary meaning of that
term'"· 162 Conn.
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The committee's concept of an

attorney's p rticipatioo in "actual government power" finds no
support in fact or authority. In Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S.
399 (1956) in opinion by Mr. Justice Black, the Court distinguished
ttorneys from "officers within the conventional meaning of that term":
''It has been stated many times that wyers are
'officers of the c wrt. ' One of the most max
fr quently r pe t d t tements to this ffect ppears
in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court
pointed out there, however, that an attorney wa not
an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term.
Cert inly nothing that was said in Ex parte rland
or in any oth r c s decided by this Court places
attorneys in the s me category MllhC •• as mar hals,
bailiffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials
a lawyer is ngaged in a private profession, important
though it be to our ystem of justice. In general he
makes his own declaims, follows his own best
judgm nt, coll ets his own fees and runs hi own
business. The ord 'offic r' as
it ha

2.
always been applied to lawyers conveys a different
meaning from the word 'officer' as applied to people
serving as officers within the conventional meaning
of that term. " 350 U.s. at 405.
Attorneys do indeed occupy professional positions of
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties cor relative
with their vital right of access to the courts. Attorney also, by
virtue of their professional aptitudes and natural interests, have

government at all levels. Yet, they are net officials of government
by virtue of being attorneys. Nor does the status of holding a license
to practice law place one so close to the core of the political process
as to e onsider him a participant in the shaping of government policy
o r the exercise of government power. In short, the practice of
law is not a position in government; it is a profession from which
qualified resident aliens may not be validly excluded.

,.
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The Court has consistently emphasized that a state which
adopts a suspect classification ''bears a heavy burden of justification",
Mc_Lau~li~

v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964), a burden which,

though variously formulated, requires the state to meet certain
standards of proof. At the outset, there must be a showing that
the state's interest or purpose is "constitutionally acceptable".
Id., at 192; the mere desire to punish or disfavor resident aliens
as a class would, of course, not be a permissible purpose. The
state also must show that its interest could fairly be characterized
4
5
6
as "substantial",. "overriding!' or "compelling". :ftllt Finally,

the state must show that the use of the suspect classification is
"necessary to the accomplishment" of its interest or purpose.
~c~_aughlin

v. Florida, 379 U.S. at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388

u.s. 1, 11 (1967).

4:-·- united states v. O'Brien, 391 u.s. 367, 377 (1967\,

,

2.

n
We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the state,
has not carried its heavy burden of justification. The Committee
does not assert that the state interest in upholding Rule 8( 1) is to
favor citizens by protecting them from the competition of resident
alien lawyers. Rather, the Committee's position is that the state
7

action is justified by the special role of the lawyer in our society.
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The Court has consistently emphasized that a state which adopts
a suspect classification ''bears a heavy burden of justification," McLaughlin
v. Florida , 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964), a burden which, though variously
formulated, requires the state to meet certain standards of proof. At the
outset, there must be a showing that the state's interest or purpose is
"constitutionally acceptable." Id., at 192; the mere desire to punish or
disfavor resident aliens as a class would, of course, not be a permissible
purpose. The state also must show that its interest could fairly be
characterized as "substantial' n 4 "overriding," 5 or "compelling." 6
Finally, the state must show that the use of the suspect classification is
reasonably'hecessary to the accomplishment" of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest. McLa3hlin v. Florida, 379
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).

4

United states v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1967).
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No. 1336 -Griffiths
MR • .nJSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a novel question regarding the constraints
imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
on the qualifications which a State may require for admission to the
bar. Appellant, Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of Netherlands, came
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she

married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of

1/

Connecticut.-

After her graduation from law school, she applied in

1970 for permission to take the Connecticut bar examination. The
bar association found her qualified in all respects save that she was
not a citizen of the United States, as required by Rule 8(1) of the

2/
Connecticut Practice Book (1963), -:...1but on that account refused to
allow her to take the examination. She then sought judie ial relief on
the ground that the regulation was unconstitutional. Her claim was
rejected first by the SUperior Court and ultimately by the Connecticut
Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A.2d 281 (1972). We noted
probable jurisdiction, 406 U.s. 966 (1972), and now hold that the

3/
regulation unconstitutionally discriminates against resident aliens.-

. ) .... J~,

-2-

I.
We begin by sketching the background against which the State
Bar Examing Committee, appellee here, attempts to justify the total
preclusion of aliens from the practice of law. It has long been
established that a resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment• s directive that a state must not "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "

.!.:£:., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 u.s. 356, 369 (1886). While Congress
has wide power to regulate immigration and naturalization, .!..:.£!.,
Fong Yue Ting v. United states, 149 U.s. 698 (1893), a lawfullyadmitted resident alien is in most respects a full member of our
society and must, under the Constitution, be treated as such. Indeed,
as the Court recently held,
"classifications based on alienage, like those
based on nationality or race, are inherently
I

suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny."
Graham v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 365, 371-372

II
I

(1971).
The general principles regarding the rights of resident aliens
under the Equal Protection Clause have found application in a number

- 3-

of cases involving state laws interfering with the efforts of resident
aliens to earn a livelihood. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, this Court
invalidated a municipal ordinance regulating the operation of laundries,
on the ground that the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against
Chinese operators. Several decades later, the Court struck down an
Arizona statute which required employers of more than five persons to
employ eighty percent "qualified electors or native-born citizens of
the United states or some sub-division thereof." Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 38 (1915). As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes:
"It requires no argument to show that the right

to work for a living in the common occupations
of the community is of the very essence of the
personal freedom and opportunity that it was
the purpose of the /P'ourteenthJ Amendment
to secure. /Citations omitted.J If this could
be refused solely upon the ground of race or

nationality, the prohibition of the denial of
equal protection of the laws would be a barren
form of words." 239 U.s. , at 41.
On similar reasoning, finally, the Court ruled unconstitutional a
California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to

- 4-

persons "ineligible to citizenship." Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Commission, 334 U.s. 410 (1948).
To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the employment
rights of resident aliens has not been an unbroken one. In Crane v.
New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), a statute prohibiting the employment
of aliens on public works projects was upheld over an equal protection
challenge, apparently on the theory that the state might constitutionally
favor citizens over aliens in the distribution of limited resources, in
that case a limited number of job openings. As explained in Graham v.
Richardson, suera, 403 U.S., at 372-374, however, that theory was
repudiated by implication in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm. , suera,
and retains no force in the present context. The mere desire to favor
citizens in the allocation of employment or other economic opportunities
no longer serves as an adequate justification for discrimination against
resident aliens.
I I.

The Examining Committee insists nonetheless that even if the
state may not practice or mandate employment discrimination against

''
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resident aliens as a general matter, the special role of the attorney

4/

justifies excluding aliens from the practice of law.-

In

Connecticut,

the Committee points out, the maxim that an attorney is an "officer of
the court" is given concrete meaning by a statute which rm kes every
attorney admitted to practice a "commissioner of the Superior Court."
As such, an attorney has authority to "sign writs, issue subpoenas,
take recognizances, and administer oaths," Conn. Gen. Stat. §51-85,
and, in so doing, to command the assistance of a county sheriff or
town constable. Conn. Gen. stat. 8 52-90. Because of these and other
powers,
"The courts not only demand their loyalty,
confidence and respect but also require them
to function in a manner which wlll foster public
confidence in the profession and, consequently,
the judicial system." 162 Conn., at 262-263,
294 A2d, at 287.
It is undisputed that Connecticut "has a legitimate interest in
determining whether /in applicantJ has the qualities of character and
professional competence requisite to the practice of law," Baird v.
state Bar of Arizona, 401 U.s. 1, 7 (1971) (opinion of Black, J.).

- 6-

By the same token, though, it is too late to suggest that the standards
for admission to the bar are not subject to constitutional constraints.

"rA _7ny qualification must have a rational connection with the
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law," Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957), and may not be "invidiously
discriminatory."

~·

, at 239.

No claim is made that resident aliens as a class lack the
competence or personal character necessary for the practice of law.
But, in defense of the rationality of distinguishing between citizens and
resident aliens, the Committee contrasts the citizen's undivided
commitment to this country with the resident alien's possible conflict
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a resident
allen attorney might in the exercise of her functions ignore her
responsibilities to the courts and her clients in favor of the interests of
a foreign power.
We find this danger a remote and unreal one. The Committee
makes no convincing demonstration that the practice of law offers
meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interests of the United

- 7-

States, It in no way denigrates the attorney's high responsibilities to
observe that the powers "to sign writs, issue subpoenas, take
recognizances t and administer oaths" are customary concomitants of
the practice of law rather than matters of state. Nor has the Committee
shown the relevance of citizenship to the likelihood that an attorney
will protect faithfully the interests of her clients.
Even if the Committee's contentions were treated as having
demonstrated that some resident aliens may be unsuited for the practice
of law, that would be no justification for a wholesale ban. The Committee calls our attention to Pearl Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Harrington,
38 F. Supp. 411 (D. Mass.), aff'd. per euriam 313

u.s.

549 (1941),

which upheld the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute barring
aliens from positions as resident managers of alien insurance companies
doing business in Massachusetts. While the Court's summary disposition in Pearl does not afford insight into the grounds of its decision,
the affirmance was presumably based on an analysis most fully
elaborated in Clarke v. Dekebach, 274

u.s.

392 (1927). There, the

Court was faced with a challenge to a city ordinance prohibiting the
is.suance to aliens of licenses to operate pool and billiard rooms.

- 8-

Characterizing the business as one having "harmful and vicious
tendencies," the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the ordinance:
"It was competent for the city to make such
a choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding
from the conduct of a dubious business an entire
class rather than its objectionable members
selected by more empirical mothods." 274 U.S.,
at 397.
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimination against

5/
resident aliens in a wide variety of occupations.At least after Graham v. Richardson, supra, such reasoning
is no longer sufficient to justify discrimination against aliens. It is of
the essence of "strict judicial scrutiny," 403 U.s., at 372, that a
state must where possible use "empirical methods" rather than broad
proscriptions to separate the qualified from the unqualified.
In the present context, Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge

on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training and
I

1

familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such tests of competence,
it lrequires a new attorney to take both

an "attorney's oath" to perform

- 9-

6/
her functions faithfully and honestly- and a "Commissioner's oath"
to !'support the constitution of the United states, and the constitution of

Connecticut." Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to

7/
subscribe to the substance of both oaths,- and Connecticut may
quite properly conduct a character investigation to insure in any given
case "that an applicant is not one who •swears to an oath pro forma
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to
the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 885 U.s. 116, 182." Law students Research

8/

Council v. Wadmond, supra, 401 U.s. , at 164.- And once admitted
to the bar, as the cases cited by the Committee amply demonstrate,

9/

attorneys are subject to discipline of abuse of their powers.-

In sum,

the Committee has simply not established that it must exclude all aliens
from the practice of law in order to vindicate its undoubted interest in
high professional standards.
III.
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, quite

different argument in support of Section 8(1). Appellee's Brief, p. 10.
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes necessary to
maintain high standards in the legal profession, but rather that attorneys
must be citizens almost as a matter of definition.

,.

•'

~

- .,.

- 10 The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from the
fra.nchis in all fifty States and their disqualification under the Constitution from holding office as President, Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a
member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the
Senate, Art. 1, I 3, cl. 3. These and myriad other federal and state
statutory and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee contends,
a pervasive recognition that ''participation in the government structure
as voters and office holders," Appellee's Brief, p. 11, is inescapably
an aspect of citizenship.
Whatever the merits of this view in other contexts, we are
satisfied that the attorney does not occupy a position so close to the core
of the political process as to warrant the exclusion of aliens. The
attorney as attorney neither selects those who wUl set governmental
policy nor sets it herself. The practice of law does, of course, impinge
upon the political process broadly conceived, but notwithstanding the
powers conferred by custom and law, the attorney is principally the
representative of her clients.

- 11 ..
Accordingly, we hold that Section 8(1) violates the Equal
Protection Clause. The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

I

;

I

I
I

·'

FOOTNOTES

1. Appellant is eligible for naturalizatioo by reason of her

marriage to a citizen of the Unlted States and residence in the
United States for more than three years, 8

u. S. C.

§

1430(a), She

has not filed a declaration of intent to become a citizen of the United
States, 8 U. S. C.

§

1445(f), and has no present intentionof doing so.

Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Netherlands.
8 U. S.C.

§

1448(a).

2. The rule was first promulgated in 1879. Application
of

Griffith~,

162 Conn. 249, 253, 294 A. 2d 281, 283 (1972). Before

that time, aliens were apparently admitted to practice on the same
basis as citizens.
3. Because we find that the rule denied equal protection,
we do not reach appellant's other claims.

2.
4. Appellant denies that this was indeed the State•s purpose
in requiring citizenship for the practice of law, noting citizenship
is also required of practitioners in other fields, including hairdressers

and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat.

Gen. Stat.

§

§ 20-250,

architects, Conn.

20-291, and sanitarians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-361.

Because we dispose of the ease on other grounds, we do not consider
this dar.tlomx claim.
5. See eases collected at Note, Constitutionality of
Re~trietion!. _~

Aliens' Right to Work, 57 Columbia Law Review

1012, 1021-1023 (1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending

lightning
of soft drinks to the selling of~ rods).

The full scale

of restrictions imposed on JI!XJIZ:the work opportunities of aliens
in 1946 is shown by M. KDnvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in

American Law 190-211 (1946).

3.
6. The text of the attorney's oath is as follows:
''You solenmly swear that you will do no fllsehood,
nor consent to any to be dme in court, and, if you know
of any to be done, you wtll give informaticm thereof to
the judges, or one of them, that it may be reformed;
you will not wittingly, or willingly promcte, sue or cause
to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or
consent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre
or malice; but will exercise the office of attorney,
within the court wherein you may practice, according
to the best of your learning and discretion, and with
fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so
help you God.
J. S. App. , p. 44.

7. Because the commissioner's oath 1s an oath to "support
the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of
Connecticut, so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof"
[emphasis added], appellant could not of course take the oath
as prescribed. To the extent that the oath reiterates Rule 8(l)'s
citizenship requirement, it shares the same constitutional
*'•'(•be defects when required of prospective members of the bar.

4.
8. We find no merit in the contention that only citizens
can in good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution.
We

note that all persons inducted into the armed services, including

resident aliens, are required by 10 U.S. C. 502 to take the
following oath:
"I, -

, to solemnly swear (or

affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance
to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the
President of the United States and the orders of the
officers appointed over me, according to regulations
and the llJodac Uniform Code of Military Justice.
So help me God. "
If aliens can take this oath when the nation is making use of their

services in the national defense,

.• - ; 1.1.1 1.4.

* ·:. resident alient

applicants for admission to the bar can sur ly not be precluded,
as a class, from taking an oath to support the Constitution, on
the theory they cannot take the oath in good faith.
i

9. Appellee's Brief, pp. 20-21 (citing, e. g., Doolittle

I
I

I

I

v. 5;lr.trk, 47 Conn. 316 (1879)).

\

\

\
I

(
(

I
I
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II.

We hold that the committee, acting on behalf of the state, has
not carried its heavy burden of justification. The state's ultimate interest
here implicated is to assure the requisite qualifications of persons licensed
to practice law. It is undisputed that a state has a legitimate and substantial interest in determining whether an applicant possesses "the character
and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law." Law

a

students Research Counsel v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1970). See
also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.s. 36, 40-41 (1961). But no question
is raised in this case as to applicants' character or general fitness. Rather,
the sole basis for disqualificatbn is her status as a resident alien. The
committee defends Rule 8(1), requiring that applicants for admission to the
bar be citizens of the United states, on the ground that the special role of
'·

'

)

the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice of law. It is pointed
out that in Connecticut the maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court"

··'

-2is given concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer a
"commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a lawyer has authority
to "sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, administer oaths and
take depositions and acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat.

§ 51-85.

In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer may command the

assistance of a county sheriff or a town constable. Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 52-90.
Beaause of these and other powers, it is noted that:
"the courts not only demand their loyalty, confidence and respect, but also require them to
function in a manner which will foster public confidence in the profession and, consequently, the
judicial system." 162 Conn. at 262-263, 294
A. 2d, at 287.

The committee also emphasizes a citizen's undivided allegiance to
this country and contrasts this with a resident alien's possible conflict of
loyalties. From this, the committee concludes that a resident alien lawyer

..

,I •

-3might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the
courts - and even his clients - in favor of the interest of a foreign power.
We find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way denigrates a
lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that the powers "to sign writs
and subpoenas, take recognizances,

Lang? administer oaths" hardly in-

volve matters of state policy or acts of such extraordinary responsibility
as to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that the practice of
law offers meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interest of the
United States. Certainly the committee has failed to show the relevance
of citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to protect faithfully
the interest of his clients.
It is settled doctrine that a state's requirements for admission to

the bar are subject to constitutional constraints.
"A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have
a rational connection with the applicant's fitness

-4or capacity to practice law. Douglas v. Noble,
261 U.S. 165; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall.
277, 319-320. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.s. 502. Obviously an applicant could not be
excluded merely because he was a Republican
or a Negro or a member of a particular church.
Even in applying permissible standards, officers
of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there
is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet
these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356." Schware 'V. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 u.s. 232, 239 (1956):
And at least since Graham v. Richardson, supra, a

classif~ation

directed

against aliens is a suspect one, imposing upon the state the heavy burden
of justification mentioned above. Acknowledging, as we have, that a state
does have a substantial interest in the qualifications of those admitted to
the practice of law, the arguments advanced by the committee fall short
of showing that the classification established by Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut
Practice Book (1963) is reasonably necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest. There is certainly no justification for a broad proscription against all resident aliens with no effort being required to distinguish
the qualified from the unqualified. Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge

-5on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training and familiarity
with Connecticut law. Apart from such tests of competence, it requires
a new lawyer to take both an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions
1.1

faithfully and honestly~ and a "commissioner's oath" to "support the
lv

Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of Connecticut. ">IF
Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the
~

substance of both oaths,'* and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a
character investigation to insure in any given case "that an applicant is
not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting
his disagreement with or indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385
U.s. 116, 132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra,

If

401 U.S., at 164.

Moreover, once admitted to the bar, lawyers are subject

to continuing scrutiny by the organized bar and the courts. In addition
to

di.--~ipline

for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-admission

-6sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions

... In sum, the Committee simply has not established that

;5

and disbarment.

it must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order to windicate
its undoubted interest in high professional standards.

~DRAFT
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the op1mon of the
Court.
This case presents a novel question as to the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a
State may require for admission to the bar.. Appellant,
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In
1967, she married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of Connecticut.' After her graduation
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to
--~ta"" e the Connecticut bar examination. TheJ:w..psseejp
.._ found her qualified in all respects save that she was
not a citizen of the United StatesL as required by Rule
8 ( 1) of the Connecticut Practice Book ( 1963), ~ and on

l ~......... )'
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1 Appdlant is eligible for naturalization b)' reason of her marriage
to a citizen of the United Stale~ and re~idence in the United State
for more than three years, 8 U. S. C. § 14:30 (a). She hns 1101 filed
a declaration of intent ion to become a C'it izen of the United States,
8 U. S. C. § 14.J.5 (f), and has no pre~r nt int<'ntion of doing so.
Apprllant' · Brief, p. 4. In orciN to brcomc a cit izrn, a]Jpellant
would br required to renounce her citizenship ol' the Netherlands.
8 U.S. C. § 144 (a).
2
The rules arc promulgated by the judgrs of the Stq)('rior Courb--o ~ ) )
- Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-80 'l'llll fl!tdm .. :er IB Rpl,c, s (1) "'HI tit*"Wahljshcd jn 1 ~~~~ 4 ?~1i;pa<&~&1 ~f ~11i,qtHs, W~t~nli. i18, 11&3.,
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•

.

...

I

71-1336-0PINION
2

APPLICATION OF GRIFFITHS

L t?at account refused to allow her to take the examination. She then sought .i udic.ial relief, asserting that the
regulation was unconstitutional. Her claim was rejected
first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 162 Conll. 249, 294 A. 2d 281
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 966
(1972~, al.ld.now hold ~hat th~ l'-9gtl:latioli unconstitutionally d1scrunmates against resident aliens. a

L

I

We begin by sketching the background against which
e State ~ar .Examining Committee~peHce ht'N\ atnpts to .JUstify the total exclusion of aliens from the
actice of law.

From its inception , our nation welcomed and drew strength from
the immigration of aliens. Their contributions to the social and
~f-' ..,e-~. t
f; J.f ~L ~
economic life of the country were~
·
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"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United
States. It has not , as far as we know , ever been
made in any State , or in any case , to depend on
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to practice , both in the State and Federal courts, who were
not citizens of the United States or of any State.~
Bradwell v. The State, 16 Wall. 130 , 139 (1872). -,

~
(' ,Shortly thereafter, • • • • in 1879, Connecticut established the predecessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens from the practice

-

of law. 162 Conn., at 253 , 294 A.2d, at 283. In subsequent

•
3, Because we find that the rule denies equal
protection , we do ntt reach appellant ' s other claims .

4 . We do not,of course , rely on Bradwell to
establish that admission to the bar may not be
made to depend on citizenship . The holding of that
case was simply that the right to practice law is
not a "privilege or immunity" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment .

:.,,,
h

'

'I

,t

·o¢

-3-

decades, wide-ranging restrictions for the first time began to impair
significantly the efforts of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen
~s
occupations.

In the face of this trend, the Court nonetheless held in 1886
that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's directive that a State must not
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, l18 U.S. 356 , 369 (1886). The

decision in Yick Wo invalidated a municipal ordinance regulating the
operation of laundries on the ground that the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against Chinese operators. Some years later, the
Court struck down an Arizona statute requiring employers of more
than five persons to emply at least 80% "qualified electors or nativeborn citizens of the United States or some sub-division thereof."

J ~

See J. Higham, Strangers in the Land 46, 161, 183 (2d ed. 1965).
The full scale of restrictions imposed on the work opportunities of
aliens in 1946 is shown by M. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in
American Law 190-2ll (1946).

/ Truax v. Raich, 230 U. S. 33 (1915). As stated for the
Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:
/ · " It requires no argument to show that the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of
the LFourteenth l Amendment to secure. [Citations
.omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a
barren form of words." 230 U. S., at 41.
On similar reasoning, the Court ruled unconstitutional a
California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing
licenses to persons "ineligible to citizenship." Takahashi
v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948).

I

l

l

\

·'
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To be sure, the cour:-:e of decisions protecting the employment rights of resident aliens has not been an unswerving one.6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies,"
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the
ordinance:
"It was competent for the city to make such a
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class
rather than its objectionable members selected by
more empirical methods." 274 U, S., at 397.

1

\

This easily expandable proposition supported discrimina\
tion against resident aliens in a wide range of occupation@< 7 }
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were undermined in Takahashi, where the Court stated that "the
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits."
334 U. S., at 420. In deed, -ilil~ll!l!-'!~1-!·[llllliil

" [ C Jlassifications based on alienage, like those based
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
'~eo nl~o People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. K 427, aff'd

7

s.ub nom. Crane v. New York, 2;39
. S. 195 (1915); but see
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S{!!:.t 370
/-GSce case~ collectrd at Notr, Constitutionality of R0~trirtions on
Alirns' Right to Work , 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 1021-1023 (1957)
(restriction~ ranging from thr vrnding of soft drink::> to the ::;elling
of lightning rod::;).
·

·.
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J

minority [see United Slates v. Carolene Products
Co ., 304 U. S. 144, 152- 153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."
Graham, v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Footnotes omitted.)G>-f1f
The Court has collsistently emphasized that a State
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S.
184, 196 ( 1964) , a burden which, though variously formulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of
proof. In order to justify the usc of a suspect classification, a State must show that its ~urpose or interest is
both constitutionally permissible 7 and substantial~ and
that its usc of the classification is "necessary to the accomplishment" of its purposef or the safeguarding of its
interest.
JII

[

l

Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support
the economy, serve in the armed forces, and cort: ribute
in myriad other ways to our society,

It is Plally

a_

appropriate that a State bear
it deprives

~

heavy • burden when

! -t~e;M
.......
-....-z.t-..-I of employment

opportunities.

II
We hold that the Committee, acting· on behalf of th
State, has not carried its
ur en• . . . . ..iiiiiiiiit:GL:"
The State's ultimate intere t here implicated is to assure
the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice

'i

'f
/0

f(

(-Q\lllwugh alienagr is gcnrrally rquatcd with race as a supsec t
dassifirat ion, we did not drcidr in Graham nor do we deride here
wlwlhcr there might be circumstances, such as armed hostilities between the U11ited State~ and the country of which an alien is a
citizen, in whieh alienage would not be suspect.
(~isrrimination or segrcgat ion for it:,; own sake i>:> not , of course,
a constitutionnll~· pcrmi,Hible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of
Edutation, 3-!7 U.S. -!8:~, -!95 (1954); liicLaughlin v. Florida, supra.
1-!J!;he ::;tate interc>:>t required has been characterized as " ol'erricling,"
lt1 cLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Viroinia, .3R8
U. S. 1, 11 (1967), "comprlling," Graham v. Richardsou, 40:3 U.S.,
at :375, "important," Dunn v. Blu111stein, 405 U. S. 3:30, .34:3 (1972),
or ":mbslantial," ibid. We atlribntc no particular significance to
the:,;c varia! ion~ in die I ion.
f---:!;>!1 cLaughlin v. Flor·ida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388

U. S., at 11.

\

l

l
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t ~ ~ It is undisputed that a State has a~-·--ra:mr--"""""-----.~i~

I

f~

f '3

substantial interest in determining whether an applicant
possesses "the character and general fitness requisite for
an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Research Council v. TVadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970).
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40--41
(1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examine1's, 353 U. S.
232, 2SO (1056)0 But no question is raised in this case
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather,
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resident alien.
The Committee defends Rule 8 (I)'s requirement that
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the
United States on the ground that the special role of
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given
concrete meaning by a. statute \vhich makes every lawyer
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a
lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85.

~ ]lprllant

denies that thi::; was indrrd the Statr'H purpose in
citizenship for thr practice of !ttw, noting that f'it izen~hip
is also rrquirrd of prnctitionrrs in othrr firlds, including hairdressers
and cosmrtieians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architcctH , Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 20-201, and sanitarinns, Conn. Orn. Stat. § 20-:361. Brcause
we di~pose of the ca!:ic on other ground::;, we do noL consider this
claim.
~n this connection, l\Ir. Justice Frnnkfurter wrote:
"From a profrs!:'ional chargrcl with such rrsponsibilitie~ there must
be exactrd thoc;r qualitieH of truth-spraking, of a high ::;en:-;e of honor,
of grnnite di:-;crrtion, of the "trictest ob:<ervancr of fiduciar~ · rrsponsibility, that luwe, throughout the centurir~< , bren comprndiou::;J~· desrribrd as 'moral charactrr.'" Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U. S. 232, 247 (1957) (concurring opinion),

rr~;.ing
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In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-90. Because of these
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court commented that:
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, confidence and respect, but also require them to function in a manner which will foster public confidence
in the profession and , consequently, the judicial system. " 162 Conn., at 262- 263, 294 A. 2d, at 287.
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Conneeticut,
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power.e
vVe find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that
frequen1ly reprrsent foreign count ric~ and the naof such countrirs in litigation in thr courts of the United
Statrs, a::; wrll as in othrr mattrrs in this count r)·. In Huch rC'j)rC'::;C'n· . , su J<'C o m; roC' as an "ofwC'l' o
tation , the duty of the
lhC' court," is to fmtllC'r the intrre~ts of hi~ dirnts by all lawful
means, C'VC'll wbrn those interC'st~ arc in conflict "·ith 111C' intC'rest;;
of thC' l JnitC'd States or of a State. But this reprrsentation im·oh·es
i1o conflict of intNC'st in the itwidions l:iC'I1SC'. RatllC'r, it casts ihc
· in his 10norC'd and traditional rolco a::; an aut10rizrd but
indC'pC'nclent agrnt acting to vindieatC' thr legal rights of a client,
whoever it may br. It is conceintblr th:tt an alien licensed to practice law in ibis countr)· could find himself in a position where he
might. be callrd upon to represent his countr)· of citizenship against
thr United States in r·ircumsUtnceH where there mny be a conflict
hetweC'n hi,; obligation~ to the two <'otmlric~. Tn Hurh ran' ~ituationH,
an honorable perHon, whether an alirn or not, would dcrline the
reprr~rntat ion.

St. t:

p
'

i"t'1l-HH''Ht"l.rti'

'•

~
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the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters
of state policy or acts of such unique re ponsibility as
to rntrust them only to citizrns. Nor do we think that
tlw practice of law offrrs mraningfu l opportunities adversely to affect the iiJteresL of the United 8tatcs. Certainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer\'Uil fail to protect faithfully the interest of his clients. 'F'
Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for
a wholesale ban.
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these
standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S,
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U. S., at 239.
This constitutional warning is especially salient where,
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explil/t
use of a suspect classification. Although , as we have
acknowledged, a State doc have a substantial interest
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice o£
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short
of showing that the classification established by Rule
8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) is necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest,
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-bycase basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.
Connecticut can, and docs, require appropriate training
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both
an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully

71-1336-0PINION
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and honestl
a a "commissioner's oath" to "suppor.t
the Constitution of ~ United States, and the Constitution of ConnectiCut.'h f Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both
oath(!i> and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a
character investigation to insure in any given case "that
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro fornia
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement wiLh or
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd , :385 U. S. 116,
132." Law Students ~earch Council v. Wadmond,
sup!·a, 4oi U. $., at 164. " Moreover, once admitted t
t\"v 1 p;!l'e information therrof to the judge;;, or one of them, that it
may be rrformed; you will not wittingly, or willinp;ly promote, Hue
or etnl~e to be ~ ued, any fnl~e or unlawful suit, or gi1·e aid, or consent , to the ;;a me; you will drlay no man for lucre or malice; buL
will exerri~e the office of attorney, within the court 11·herrin ) ' 011 may
practice, according to the be~t of your learning nncl cli;;cn't ion , and
with ficlrlity, a:; well to the court a:; to your client, ::;o help you God."
J. S. A)). ). 44.

1.r f-<!J?!heo;olemnly
text of the attorney'R ortthH iH as followR:
that you will do no falsehood, nor con;;ent to

"You
~wear
~to be clone in court, nnd, if ~·o u know of any to be done, yo u~.
' ' ~ rhere i;; no que;;tion a::; to the Yalidit~· of requiring an applicant,
as a precondition to admisHion to the hnr, to take such an oath.

11

I

t

Law Students Research Council \'. TT'admond, supra, at 161- 16-1.
~Because thr commi~sionrr'H oath is an oath to "support the
constitution of the United Rtates, and the constitution of Connrcticut, so long as you continue to be a titizen thereof" (emphasis
addrcl), appellant could not of coursr take thr oath a~ prescribed.
To the extrnt that the oath reiterateH Hulc 8 (1)'~ citiz('nship requirement, it sharer:; the ~:>ame com;titutional clcfeets when required of
prospective members of tho bar.
~We find no merit in the contention that only citizens can in
r;;;cl con~cienc(' take an oath to ~upport the Constitutwn. We note
that all persons incluetecl into the armed sen·ices, including resident
aliens, arc re(Juirecl by 10 U. S. C. § .502 to take the followinp; oath:
"I,
, do solemnly swear (or nffirm) that I will
support nnd defend the Constitution of the United Rtat<'s ag~1inst
all enemies, foreign and dome;;tic ; that I will bear true faith and

71-1336-0PINION
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the bar, lawyers arc subject to continuing scrutiny by
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of postadmission sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarmen B' In
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order
to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional
standard~

1 I Cf

III
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another,
different argument in support of Rule 8 (I). Its
thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes necessary to maintain high standards in the legal profession,
allrgiancP to thr ~mnr; and that I will ohr)' ihe ordrrs of the Prrsidrnt of tht' Unitrd SUttrs and thr orciN~ of ihc officrr~ nppoinied
over mr, according to rrgulatiom; and the Uniform Codr of l\Iilitary
.lustier. So help me God."

If nlirns can take this oath when the Nation iH making uo;r of their
srrYicrs in the national dcfrm;r, rr~idrnt alirn applic:tnts for ndmission to the bnr surrly can not be prrclndrd, as a elass, from taking
an oath to Hnpport the Constitution on the theory thry cannot take
thr oath in good faith.
~rr, e. g., Doolittle v. Clark, ·17 Conn. 316 (1il79). Apart from
tlw courtH, the profrs~ion itHclf has long subjected its mrmbrrs to
discipline unclrr codes or cannons of prol'rs~ional rthic·s. A:-; C':11'1)· aH
1908 thr Americ:m Bar A~sociation adopted 32 Canons of Profrssional Ethics. In 1970, following several year~ of st nd)· and rrrxamination, the House of Drlegatrs of the AmNican Bar A~socia
iion approved a new Code of Profrssional Hesponsibilit)·, which provides detailed rthical presrript ions as well a~ comprehensive code of
disriplinar·y rules. The ABA Code of Profr~sional Rr,-p<msibilit)' has
e~incr brrn appro\·rd or ncloptrcl in -States, including Connecticut.
R orts of the American Bar Association, YO!. 97 (1972) p. - .
Nothing in our rule~ prohibits from aclmis~ion to pr:1cticr in
C'ourt rrsidrnt alirns who havr bern admitted to pmctirc "for
thrrr )·ears pm;t in the highrHt court of a State, Trrritory, District,
Commonwralth, or Pos~rssion" and whose " private and profe~~ional
chn.r:wtrn.; shall appear to be good." Rule 5, Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States ( 1970).

\
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/ but rather that lawyers must be citizens almost as a matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification
under the Constitution from holding office as President,
Art. 2, ~ 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, ~ 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1,
( § 3, cl. 3. These and ·myriad"" other federal and statutory
- and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee contends, a pervasive recognition that "participation ~tbe
government structure as voters and office holders" is
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief,

---~

~~~red in support of the claim that the lawyer is an

'office holder" in this sense is an enhanced version of
the proposition, disoossecl above, that he is an "officer
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and
;vith the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief,
p. 5.
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This comports with the view of tho Court expressed by Mr. Justice Black in Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399
(1956):
"It has been stated n1any times that lawyers are
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out
there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer'

I II'\

7
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or
in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court
clerks or j udgcs. Unlike these officials a lawyer is
engaged in a private profession, important though
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment,
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer'
as applied to people serving as officers within the
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405.

'#

Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts.
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and·
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in government throughout the history of our country. Yet, they
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.
Nor docs the status of holding a license to practice law
place one so close to the core of the political proc~
to make him a formulator of government polic~ ( ~/
We hold that § 8 (1) violates the Equal Protection
d-f"'-.,.C"'l~au~s~<e
~ The j udgmcnt of the Connecticut Supreme
Court is reversed, and the case is rcm.anded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

~ ( l--t!'J).3ecnuse thr Committee has failed to establish that the lawyer
{

is-;n "office holdrr," we nred not and do not decide whrt her there is
merit in the genrral argument and, if so, to what offices it would
ap )ly.
._~.,
- 0,~n a thought fnl opinion, the Cnlifornin Supreme Court unanimously drrlarrd nmonstitutional a similar California rulr. Raffarlli
v. Co111mitter of Bar E:wminers, Cal. 3d - , 496 P. 2d 1264,
101 Cal. Rptr. R96 (1972), Sec also Application of Park, 484 P. 2d
690 (Alaska 1971) .

·-
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents a novel question as to the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a
State may require for admission to the bar. Appellant,
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In
1967, she married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of Connecticut.' After her graduation
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to
take the Connecticut bar examination. The bar association found her qualified in all respects save that she was
not a citizen of the United States, as required by Rule
8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963),~ and on
1 Apprllanl is rl igible for naturalization by rrason of her marriage
to a citizen of the United States and rr,.;idrner in thr United States
for more than three years, 8 U. S. C. § 1-+30 (a). She ha;.; not filed
a declaration of intention to become a eitizru of the United States,
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f), and has no prrsrnt intention of doing ~o .
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a cit izrn, apprllant
would be rrquirrcl to renounce her citizenHhip of the Ndherlunds.
8 U.S. C. § 1448 (a).
2 The rules arc promulgated by thr juclgr:-; of the Suprrior Court.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-80. The prcdccr~sor to Rule 8 (1) was first
established in 1879. Application of Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 253,
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that account refu8cd to allow her to take the examination. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the
regulation was unconstitutional. Tier claim was rejected
first by the Superior Court ancl ulLimately by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 162 Conu. 249, 294 A. 2d 281
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 966
( 1972), and now hold that the regulation unconstitutionally discriminates against resident aliens. 3
I

We begin by sketching the background against which
the State Bar Examining Committee, appellee here, attempts to justify the total exclusion of aliens from the
practice of law. It has long been established that the
national Government has "broad constitutional powers
in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the
United States, the period they may remain, [and as to
the l regulation of their conduct before naturaliz~
tion . . . . " Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334
U. S. 410, 419 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
66 (1941); Fang Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893). But a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's
directive that a State must not "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
294 A. 2d 281, 283 (1972). Before that time, aliens wrrr nppnrently
admiltrd to practice on the :same basi::; a::; citizrn::;, both in Connrcticut and d~rwhen.>. In 1872 thi::; Court ~;tatrd in anothr1' context
that the right of admis~ion to practice in the court:; of a State
"in no Hrnse drpendH on cit izen:ship of lhr United Slatrs. It ha~ not,
as far as wr know, evrr been made in any State, or in any casr, to
deprncl on eilizenship at all. Crrtainly many prominrnt nncl distinguished lawyrrs have bern admittrd to practicr, both in the
State and Federal court~. who wrrc not citizpn~; of the Unitrcl States
or of any State." Bradwell v. The State, 16 Wall. 1:30, 1:~9 (1872).
3 Becau8r we find that the rule denie~; equal protection, we do not
reach appellant's other claims.
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E. g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886).
Indeed, it is now settled law that a resident alien is in
most respects a full member of our society subject to
duties as well as being entitled to most of the rights of
citizenship. As noted in Graham v. Richardson, 400
U. S. 363, 376 (1971), aliens pay taxes, contribute to the
economy, may serve i11 the armed forces, and may well
be long-term residents.
The gelleral principles with respect to the rights of
resident aliens under the Equal Protection Clause have
found application in a number of cases involving state
laws interfering with the efforts of resident aliens to
earn a livelihood. In Yick Wo v. Hopkin.~, supra, this
Court invalidated a municipal ordinance regulating the
operation of laundries on the ground that the ordinance
was discriminatorily enforced against Chinese operators.
Several decades later, the Court struck dovvn an Arizona
statute which required employers of more than five persons to employ 80;/'( "qualified electors or native-born
citizens of the United States or some sub-division thereof."
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). As stated for the
Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:
"It requires no argument to show that the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. [Citations
omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a
barren form of words." 239 U. S., at 41.
On similar reasoning, the Court ruled unconstitutional a
California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing
licenses to persons "ineligible to citizenship." Takahashi
v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948).
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To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the employment rights of resident aliens has not been an unswerving one.~ In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies,"
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the
ordinance:
"It was competent for the city to make such a
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class
rather than its objectionable members selected by
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., at 397.
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimina..
tion against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations."
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were undermined in Takahashi, where the Court stated that "the
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien
inhabitants as a class is confined wiLhin narrow limits."
334 U. S., at 420. Indeed, subsequent decisions have
moved even further in requiring "empirical methods,"
holding· that:
" [ C] lassifications based on alienage, like those based
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
4
Sec al~o Prople v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd
sub nom. Crane v. New York , 239 U. S. 195 (1915); but sec
Graham v. Richardson, 40:3 U. S., at 374.

"Sec ca:<es collected at Note, Constitutionality of Rr:<trietions on
Alirns' Hight to Work, 57 Col. L. Hcv. 1012, 1021-1023 (1957)
(restrict iom; rungi11g from the vrnding of >:o ft drink:; to the srlling
of lightniug rod~). The full :::calr of rrstridion:-: imposrd on the
work opportunitirs of aliens in 19~6 is ~ hown by 1\I. Kom·itz, The
Alien and the Asiatic in American Law 190-211 (1946).
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."
Graharn v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Footnotes omitted.) a
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S.
184, 196 (1964), a burden which, though variously formulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is
both constitutionally permissible 7 and substantial/ and
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the accomplishment" of its purpose u or the safeguarding: of its
interest.
II
We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the
State, has not carried its heavy burden of justification.
The State's ultimate interest here implicated is to assure
the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice
u Although alienage is generally equated with race as a supsect
classification, we did not decide in Graham nor do we decide hero
whether there might be circumstances, such as armed hostilities between tho United StatoH and the country of which an alien is a
citizen, in which alienage would not be suspect.
7 Discrimination or segregation for its own sake is not, of course,
a constitutionally permissible pnrposr. E. g., Brown v. Board of
Education, 847 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra.
8 Tho state intoreHt rC'quirC'd has bC'en characterized as "overriding,"
McLaughlin v. Ji'lorida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Richardson, 408 U.S.,
at 375, "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, :343 (1972),
or ·'substantial," ibid. We attribute no particular significance to
thC'sc variations in diction.
u McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388

U. S., at 11.

71-1336-0PINION

6

APPLICATION OF GRIFFITHS
ConS

,
t-,•fvftol'l.:.lfl

· ·6A
e.

p~rY"'tJ.Sf

law. 10 It is undisputed that a State has a
and
substantial interest in determining whether an applicant
possesses "the character and general fitness requisite for
an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Research Council v. TVadmo11d, 401 U. S. 154. 159 (Hl70).
See also Konigsberg v. Stale Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41
(1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S.
232, 239 (1956)." But no question is raised in this case
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather,
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resi~
dent alien.
The Committee defends Rule 8 ( 1) 's requirement that
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the
United States on the ground that the special role of
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given
concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer
a "commissio11er of the Superior Court." As such, a
lawyer has authority to "sign writs and suhpoenas, take
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. ~ 51-85.
10 Appellant drnir~ that thi::; wa~ indrrd thr Statr'::; purpo~r in
rrquiring eitizrn::;hip for thr practirr of Jaw, noting that c·itizrn;;hip
18 also rrquirrd of prnctit ionrr~ in othrr firld~, inrlnding ha irclressers
and co::;mrticiam.;, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architrct~, Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 20-291, and ~anitarian::;, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-:3Gl. Because
we di~po ~e of the cm;e on other groundH, we do not con~ider this
claim.
11
In thi8 connection, l\Ir. Justice Frankfurter wrote:

"From a profr~~ional chargrd with ::;uch rc·Hpon~ibil it ir~ t ilrrr must
be exactrd those qualitirs of truth-sprnking, of a high srn~r of honor,
of granite di~crrtion , of the ~tricte;;t obsrrvame of fiduciar:-· responsibility, that ha,·e. 1lwoughout the rentmirs, bern eomprndiou~l:-· described a~ 'moral character.'" Schu•w·r v. Board of Bar E.raminrrs,
353 U. S. 2:32, 247 ( 1957) (concurring opinion).

·'

71-1336-0PINION
APPLICATION OF GRIFFITHS

7

In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. ~ 52-90. Because of these
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court commented that:
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, confidence and respect, but also require them to function in a manner which will foster public confidence
in' the profession and, consequently, the judicial system." 162 Conn., at 262- 263, 294 A. 2d, at 287.
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut,
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign powB
\Ve find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that
2
' Attorneys frequently reprc~c nt foreign count rics and the nationals of ~; u c h countries in litigation in the court" of the United
States, as well as in other matters in thi~ country. In such rcprcsrntation, tho duty of the attorney, :,;ubject to his role as an "officer of
the court," i~ to further the intC'rcst::; of his rlicnt s b~ · all lawful
mC'ans, even wllC'n tho~C' interest,; arc in <'onflict with the interest~
of the United States or of a State. But this I'C']li'CHCntation in1·olves
no conflict of interest in the iiwidious sense. Rather, it casts tho
r1tto rn e~· in hi,; honored and traditional role as nn nuthorir.ccl but
independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a cliC'nt,
whoever it may be. It is conceivable that ;~n alien li!'cnscd to practice law i'n this country could find himself in n position wh(•re he
might be called upon to represent his countr~· of cit izcnship agnin8t
the United Stiltcs in circumstance~ when• there may be a conflict
between hi" obligation:-; to the two count ric;;. In ;;uch rarr situations,
an honorable person, whether an aliC'n or not , would decline tho

rcpre~C'ntation.

(5EE

P. ~
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the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, take recogn!-:.
zances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities ad"'
versely to affect the interest of the United States. Certainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to protect faithfully the interest of his clients. 1 ~
Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for
a wholesale ban.
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these
standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U. S., at 239.
This constitutional warning is especially salient where,
as here, a State's bar admission standards 1nakc expliict
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have
acknowledged, a State doe have a substantial interest
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short
of showing that the classification established by Rule
8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) is necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest.
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-bycase basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.
Connecticut can, and docs, require appropriate training
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such
tests of c01npetence, it requires a new lawyer to take both
an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully

71-1336-0PINION
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and honestly 13 and a "commissioner's oath" to "support
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitu-tion of Connecticut." l l Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both
oaths,[" an.d Connecticut may quite properly conduct a
character investigation to insure in any given case "that
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116,
132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond,
supra, 401 U. S., at 164. w Moreover once admitted to
will give information thereof to tho judp;os, or one of t 1em, t 1a 1L
may be reformod; you will not willingly, or willing!~· promoto, sue
or cau~e to be sued, any faloe or unlawful suit, or givo aid, or ronsent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; buL
will exorrio:e the office of attorney, within the court whNoin you may
practiro, according to the be;;t of your loarning and diorrotion, :md
with fiddity, as well to the court as to your client, so help you God."
J. S. App., p. 44.
The toxt of the attorney's oaths is as follows:
"You solemnly swear that you will do no fabchood, nor ronsont to
any to be clone in court, and, if you know of any to bo done, you~
1 '1 There is no qneotion as to the validity of requiring an applicant,
as a precondition to admi~~ion to the bar, to take such an oath.
Law Students Research Council v. ll'admond, supra, at 161-164.
15 Bocau~e the rommisHionor's oath iH an oath to "support the
con::;titution of the Unitod Stato;.;, and the conHtitution of Connecticut, so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" (rmphasis
addrd), appellant could not of course takr the oath ns prescribed.
To tho rxtenL that the oath rritrratrs Hule 8 (I)'s citizenship requirement, it shares the same constitutional defects when required of
proHpect i vr members of the bar.
w We find no meriL in tho contention that only citizons can in
p;ood consrirnrr take an oath to support thr Constitution. We note
that all prrsons inducted into the armed srrYiros, including ro~idont
alien~:~, are required by 10 U.S. C.§ 502 to take thr following oath:
"I,
, do solemnly ;;wear (or affirm) that I will
support nnd defend the Cons tit ut ion of tho United States against
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
13
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the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of postadmission sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment.' 7 In
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order
to vindicate its undoubted interest in ]:ligh professio:(}al
standards. 18
III
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another,
quite different argument in support of Rule 8 (1). Its
thrust is not that resident aliens lack t_hc attributes I1ccessary to maintain high standards in the legal profession,
allegiance to thr samr; and that I will ober the orclrr~ of the Prrsident of the United States :mel the orders of the officer~ appointrd
over me, according to rrgulations and the Uniform Code of Military
.Ju~tice. So help me God."
thi~ oath whenihc Nation i~ making u;;e of their
services in thr nationnl defense, rr~iclrnt alien applic:1nt~ for admission to the bar surely can not br prrcludcd, as a cla~~, from taking
:Ul oath to support the Con~iitution on the throry thry cannot take
the onth in good faith.
17 Sec, e. g., Doolittle v. Cia1'k, 47 Conn. 816 (1870).
Apart from
the courts, the profeHHion it~elf has long ~ubjectcd its memberH to
di~cipline under code~ or cannons of profes~ional ethics. A" rarly as
1908 the American Bar Associntion adoptrd 32 Cnnon~ of Profc~
;;ional Ethics. In 1970, following severn] )'Car~ of Rt ud~· n ncl reexamination , the Hou;;r of Drlegnic~ of the American Bar As::;ociation approved a new Coclr of Profcs~ionnl H.rRponsibility, which provides drtailecl ci hical prescriptions as well :1s comprehensivr rode of
disciplinary rules. The ABA Code of Profr~~ionnl Rr~pon::;ibil ii)' haH
since been npprovrcl or acloptrd in- Stairs, including; C'onnrctirui.
Reports of the American Bar A~~ociation, vol. 97 (1972) p. - .
•s Nothing; in om rules prohibits from admission to practicr in
this Court resident alirns who have brcn admiltrcl to prnctire "for
ihrre years past in 1he hig;hest court of a State, Territon·, Dist rici,
Commonwealth, or Pos~rssion" and whose "private and profes;;ional
character:,; shall ftppcnr to br good." Rule 5, Rulrs of the Supreme
Court of the United States (1970).

If aliens can taler
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but rather that lawyers must be citizens almof't as a matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification
under the Constitution from holding office as President,
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1,
§ 3, cl. 3. These and myriad other federal and statutory
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee cont·encls, a pervasive recognition that "participation is the
government structure as voters and office holders" is
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief,

q~
::tiered in

support of the claim that the lawyer is an
"office holder" in this sense is an enhanced version of
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief,
p. 5.
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d , at 283. This comports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Justice Black in Cammer v. United Stales, 350 U. S. 399
(1956):
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out
there, hO\Yever, that an attorney was not an 'officer'

71-1336-0PINION

12

APPLICATION OF GHIFFITHS

within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or
in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is
engaged in a private profession, important though
. it be to our system of justice. In general he makes
his own decisions, follows his own be.s t judgment,
collects his own fees and runs his own busil1ess. The
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer'
as applied to people serving as officers within the
conventional meaning of that term." (FoOtnote
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405.
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts.
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in govern~
ment throughout the history of our country. Yet, they
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.
Nor docs the status of holding a license to practice law
place one so close to the core of the political process as
to make him a formulator of government policy. 10
We hold that ~ 8 (I) violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 20 The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Because the Committee has failed to establi~h that the lawyer
is an "ofiicr holclrr," we need not and do not decide whet her there is
merit in the general argument and, if so, to what offices it would
apply.
20 In a thoughtful opinion, the California Supreme Court unanimou~l)· drclarrd unconstitutional a similar California rule.
Raffaelli
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, CaL ad - , 496 P. 2d 1264,
101 Cal. H pt r. 896 ( 1972). Sec al~o Application of Park, 484 P. 2d
690 (Alaska 1971).
10
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents a novel question as to the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a
State may require for admission to the bar. Appellant,
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In
1967, she married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of Connecticut. 1 After her graduation
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to
take the Connecticut bar examination. The County Bar
Association found her qualified in all respects save that
she was not a citizen of the United States as required by
Rule 8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963), 2 and
1 Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage
to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United Stales
for more than three years, 8 U.S. C. § 1430 (a). She has not filed
a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States,
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f), and has no present intention of doing so.
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Netherlands.
8 U. S. C. § 1448 (a).
"The rules arc promulgated by the judges of the Superior Court,
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-80, and administered by the Connecticut Bar
Association.
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on that account refused to allow her to take the examination. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the
regulation was unconstitutional. Her claim was rejected
first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d 281
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 966
(1972) , and no\v hold that the rule unconstitutionally
discriminates against resident aliens.'l
I

We begin by sketching the background against which
the State Bar Examining Committee attempts to justify
the total exclusion of aliens from the practice of law.
Fron1 its inception , our Nation welcomed and drew
strength from the immigration of aliens. Their contributions to the social and economic life of the country
were self-evident. especially during the periods when the
demand for human resources greatly exceeded the native
supply. This demand was by no means limited to the
unskilled or the uneducated. In 1872, this Court noted
that admission to the practice of law in the courts of a
State
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United
States. It has not, as far as we know, ever been
made in any State, or in any case, to depend on
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to practice, both in the State ami Federal courts, who were
not citizens of the United States or of any State."
Bmdwell v. Th e State, 1G Wall. 130, 139 (1872). 4
" B ec ~mr wr find that the rulr drnir ~ rqunl prot ection, wr do not
ren r h nppr ll n nt '~ ot hrr rla im ~.
4
We do not , of cour~ e . rrl)' on Bmdwe/1 to e~ tablis b th:l t a dmi ~ 
sion to the bnr m:ly not br m ~1d e to deprnd on citizrn ~ hip. The
holdin~ of that r:l se was simp!)· that thr right to practice lnw is not
a "privilege or immunity" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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But shortly thereafter , in 1879, Connecticut established
the predecessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens
from the practice of law. 162 Conn. , at 253, 294 A. 2d,
at 283. In subsequent decades, wide-ranging restrictions
for the first time began to impair significantly the efforts
of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen occupations."
In the face of this trend, the Court nonetheless held
in 1886 that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's
directive that a State must not "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). The
decision in Yick TVo invalidated a municipal ordinance
regulating the operation of laundries on the ground that
the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against Chinese operators. Some years later, the Court struck down
an Arizona statute requiring employers of more than five
persons to employ at least 80 7'(; "qualified electors or
native-born citizens of the United States or some subdivision thereof." Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915).
As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:
"It requires no argument to show that the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. {Citations
omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a
barren form of words." 239 U. S., at 41.
On similar reasoning, the Court ruled unconstitutiona a )
California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing
"See J. Highmn , Strangers i11 the Land 4fl , 161 , 183 (2d eel. 1965).
The full sen le of rrs triction~ impo~ecl on the work opportunities of
aliens in 1946 i~ FhO\m by M. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic
in Americnn Law 190-211 (1946) .
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'icenses t~ersons "ineligible to citizenship." Takahas~
·
nd Garne Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948).
--}
To be sure, the course of decisions protectmg tlie employment rights of resident aliens has not been an un-.,. . . . .swerving one. 6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies,"
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the
ordinance:
"It was competent for the city to make such a
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class
rather than its objectionable members selected by
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., at 397.
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimination against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations. 7
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were underv. r;,t, <lHd Gonte
,;y;'f*j.l::li) the Court stated that "the
('omm 'n
3 3 'I (), S.
v:::=.-p-o_w_e_r_o_f;;--a-s-:t-a7te--:-to-ac...p._p_y~its laws exclusively to its alien
- --)
)
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits."
Lft o ( 1 9 c.t"l. J' wftereJ
334 U.S., at 420. Indeed, with the issue squarely before
n r u f111 q un co"'ll"lro"f]/ 'tin Graham v. Richardso-n, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the
1
C/
Court concluded that:
t:i ( o / ~ f'O>f'ntq
s icd ufe
" [ C] lassifications based on alienage, like those based

ho.rr;'JJ
0

r

1o
-fo

on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'

t.SSUC! ~c e

f','shtngt

f•C'en<;~~

persons '/~~ ltjrhll!

Sec also People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd
sub nom. Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915); but sec
..G.J:..aham v. Richardson, 403 U.S . 365, 374 (1971).
7
See cases collected at N otc, Constitutionality of Rcstric1 ions on
liens' Right to Work, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 1021-1023 (1957)
(reslrictions ranging from the vending of soft drinks to the :;elling
~ lightning rods).
6
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Footnotes omitted.) 8
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 ( 1964) , a burden which, though variously formulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is
both constitutionally permissible 9 and substantial/ 0 and
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the accomplishment" of its purpose n or the safeguarding of its
interest.
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the
economy, serve in the armed forces, and contribute in
myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that
a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of
employment opportunities.
8 Although alienage is generally equated with race as a suspect
c assification,
did not decide in Graham nor do we decide here
whether there might be circumstances, such as armed hostilities between the United States and the country of which an alien is a
citizen, in which alienage would not be suspect.
9 Discrimination or segregntion for its own sake is not, of course,
a constitutionally permissible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra.
10 The state interest required has been characterized as "overriding,"
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 888
U.S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.,
at 375, " important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972),
or ·'substantial," ibid. We attribute no partil'ubr significance to
these variations in diction.
1 L McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388
U. S., at 11.
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II

We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the
State, has not carried its burden. The State's ultimate
interest here implicated is to assure the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice law.'~ It is undisputed that a State has a constitutionally permissible
and substantial interest in determining whether an applicant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite
for an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Research Council v. TVadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970).
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41
(1961); Schwarr!, v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S.
232, 239 ( 1956). '" But no question is raised in this case
as to appellant's character .or general fitness. Rather,
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resident alien.
The Committee defends Rule 8 ( 1) 's requirement that
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the
United States on the ground that the special role of
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice
of law. In Connecticut. the Committee points out. the
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given
concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a
Appellant donie~ thnt this was indeed the Stntc's purpose in
requiring citizenship for the practice of law, noting that. citizenship
is nlso required of practitioners in other fields, including hairdrc~sers
and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architect~, Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 20-291, and sanitarians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-361. Bcftuse
we dispose of tho case on other grounds, we do not et)tl!"ids this
claim.
'"In this connec-tion, :\fr . .Ju~tice Fmnkfmtcr wrote:
12

"From a profe~sional charged with such respon~ibilil ies 1here must
be exarted those qualities of t.ruth-speaking, of a high sen~e of honor,
of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciar~' respollsibilit:v, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendious!~' doscribed as 'moral character.'" Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U. S. 232, 247 ( 1957) (concurring opinion).

/
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lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85.
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. ~ 52-90. Because of these
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court commented that:
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, confidence and respect. but also require them to function in a manner which will foster public confidence
in the profession and, consequently. the judicial system." 162 Conn., at 262-263, 294 A. 2d, at 287.
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut,
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power.
We find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that
the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interest of the United States. Certainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to protect faithfully the interest of his clients. 14
Lawyers frequrnt]~r rrpreRent forrig;n count rics and the naof such countries in litigation in the: courts of the United
States, as well as in other matters in 1his country. In such representation, the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an "officer of
14

tional~
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Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for
a wholesale ban.
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these
standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U. S., at 239.
This constitutional warning is especially salient where,
as here, a State's bar admission standards make expli'i&t
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have
acknowledged, a State does have a substantial interest
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short
of showing that the classification established by Rule
8 ( 1) of the Connecticut Practice Book ( 1963) is necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest.
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-bycase basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both
the court," is to further the intere~ts of hiH clients by all lawful
means, even when those interests arc in conflict with the inlerestH
of the United States or of a Statr. But this representation involves
no conflict of interest in the invidious sense. Rather, it casts the
lawyer in his honored and traditional role as an authorized but
independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a cli<·nt,
who<.'ver it may be. It is conceivable that an aliPn lirPnsed to j)rtlC1ice law in this country could find him~elf in a position whenl11c
might be called upon to reprP::;ent his country of citizcn~hip ugainst
the United StatcH in circumstances ~there may be a conllict
between his obligations to the two countries. In such rare situations,
an honorable person, whether an alien or not, would decline the
representation.

1

,,

1
w,.c.
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an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully
and honestly and a "commissioner's oath" to "support
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of Connecticut." 16 Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both
oatl~t and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a
character investigation to insure in any given case "that
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116,
132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond,
supra, 401 U. S., at 164. 18 Moreover, once admitted to
1(j

15

The text of thr attorney's oaths is as follows:
"You solemnly swear that you will do no fabebood, nor conRrnt to
an~· to be done in court, and, if you know of any to be done, you
will give information thereof to tbr judgrs, or one of them, that it
may be rrformcd; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue
or rau~c to be sued, any false or unlawful suit , or give ::tid, or consent, to the samr; you will deJa~· no man for lucre or malice; but
will exercise the office of attorney, within thr court wherein you may
practicr, according to the best of your learning and discretion , and
with fiddity, as well to the court as to your client, so help ~·ou God."
J. S. App., p. 44.
16 There is no question as to thr validity of requiring an applicant,
as a prerondition to admission to t hr bnr, to take such an oath.
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164.
17
Bccau~e the commissioner's oath i~ nn oath to "support the
constitution of the United Statrs, and the constitution of Connecticut, so Zona as you continue to be a citizen thereof" (emphasis
added), appellant could not of course take the oath as prescribed.
To the extent that the oath reiteratrs Rule 8 (I)'s citizenship requirement, it shares the same constitutional defrrt:; when required of
prospective membrr:; of the bar.
18 We find no merit in the contrntion that only citizens can in
good con~cicncc take an oath to support the Constitution. Wr note
that. all prr:;on~ inducted into the armed services, including r<'~idrnt
aliens, arc rcquirrd by 10 U. S. C. § 502 to take 1he followinf( oath:
''I,
, do solemnly swrnr (or affirm) that I will
support and dcfrnd the Con~titntion of the United States against
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true fnith and
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the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of postadmission sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment. 1n In
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order
to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional
standards. 20
III
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another,
somewhat different argument in support of Rule 8 ( 1).
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes
allrgianrr to t,hr Hamr; and thai, I will obe~· 1he order~ of the Presidrnt of the United Statr~ ami the orders of the officers appointed
ovrr me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military
.Justice. So help me God."
If aliens can take this oai,h when the ?\fation i~ making usr of their
~en·ices in the national drfensc, resident alien Gpplir:mts for :ldmis,-mon to the bar surely caf[Eot be prccludrd, as a cla~s, from taking ~ 4 ~ at
an oath to support the Constitution on the thror/1-'t hey ~\take ..f
/
the oath in good faith.
ar-e u,..ob e -1-o
\:::
'n Srr. e. g .. Doo/.i ttle v. Clark. 47 Conn. :31G (1879). Ap:1rt from
the courts, the profrssion it:<C'!f has long suhjectrd its members to
discipline under codrs or cai@i1s of profrs~ion:1l r1 hies. A.-, e:nl~r :1s
JCl08 i,hr American Bar ARsociation adopted :32 Cnnons of T'rofC'ssional Ethics. In 1970, following several ~·car~ of stud~· and rerxamination, thr Hou~e of Drlegatrs of thr American B:u· Association approvrd n nrw Codr of Professional Hrspon~ibilit~·. which provides detailed ethienl proscriptions as well as...comprehensi\·e rocl...,.
o _o_f _.,., 1
L-disriplinnry rules. Tho ABA Code of Profo~sional RoRponsihillty has
l Hinro been approvrd~ adop1rd in
• · ·
· ·
·
he tJ,~ tr1C.'I

12

.

..

~

Nothing ]n our rule~ prohibits from aclmis~ion 1o practice in
this Comt. rrsiclont nlicns who have been admitted to prnctirP "for
throe year~ past in the higlwst eomt of a Stn1o, Territor~', Di~trict,
Commonwealth, or Possrssion" and whose "private nncl profr~i'ional
rharnctrrs Rhall apponr to br good." Rule 5, Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States ( 1970).
20
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JJ<'cessary to maintain high standards in the legal profession, but rather that lawyers must be citizens almost as a
matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The argument builds upon the exclusio11 of aliens from
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification
under the Constitution from holding office as President,
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, § 3,
cl. 3. Thes<' and num0rous other federal and statutory
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee contends, a pervasive recognition that "participation in the
government structure as voters and office holders" is
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief,
p. 11. Offered in support of the claim that the lawyer is
an "office holder" in this sense is an enhanced version of
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief,
p. 5.
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This comports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Justice Black in Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399
(1956):
"It has been stated many times that lawyers arc
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out
there, however, that an a.ttorney was not an 'officer'·
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or
in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is
engaged in a private profession, important though
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment,
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer'
as applied to people serving as officers within the
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405.
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts.
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in government throughout the history of our country. Yet, they
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.
Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law
place one so close to the core of the political process as
to make him a formulator of government policy." 1
We hold that § 8 ( 1) violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 22 The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Because the Commit1 rr has failed to estn bli~h that the lawyrr
an "office holder," we need not and do not decide whether there is
merit' in the general argument and, if so, to what offices it would
apply.
22
In a thoughtful opinion, the California Supreme Court unanimously declared unconstitutional a similar California rule. Raffaelli
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, Cal. 3d - , 496 P. 2d 1264,
101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972). See also Application of Park, 484 P. 2d
690 (Alaska, 1971).
21
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
No. 71-1336
In re Application of Fre Le Poole) On Appeal from the
Griffiths for Admission to
Supreme Court of
the Bar, Appellant.
Connecticut.
[February -, 1973]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the·
Court.
This case presents a novel question as to the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a
State may require for admission to the bar. Appellant,
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In
1967, she married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of Connecticut. 1 After her graduation
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to·
take the Connecticut bar examination. The County Bar
Association found her qualified in all respects save that
she was not a citizen of the United States as required by
Rule 8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963)/ and
1 Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage
to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United States
for more than three years, 8 U. S. C. § 1430 (a). She has not filed
a declaration of intention to become a citizen of tho Unilcd States,
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f), and has no prescn L intention of doing so.
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Netherlands.
8 U. S. C. § 1448 (a).
2
The rules are promulgated by the judge,; of the Superior Court,
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§51- 0, and administered by the Connecticut Bar
Associa Lion.
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on that account refused to allow her to take the examination. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the
regulation was unconstitutional. Her claim was rejected
first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d 281
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 966
( 1972), and now hold that the rule unconstitutionally
discriminates against resident aliens.~
I

We begin by sketching the background against which
the State Bar Examining Committee attempts to justify
the total exclusion of aliens from the practice of law.
From its inception, our Nation welcomed and drew
strength from the immigration of aliens. Their contributions to the social and economic life of the country
were self-evident, especially during the periods when the
demand for human resources greatly exceeded the native
supply. This demand was by no means limited to the
unskilled or the uneducated. In 1872, this Court noted
that admission to the practice of law in the courts of a
State
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United
States. It has not, as far as we know, ever been
made in any State, or in any case, to depend on
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to practice, both in the State and Federal courts, who were
not citizens of the United States or of any State."
Bradwell v. The State, 16 ·wall. 130, 139 (1872). 4
~ Be(·ause we find that tlH' rule denic,; equal protection , we do not
reach appellant's other rlaimH.
4
We do not, of rour~c, rei~· on Bmdwell to cstabli~h that. admiRsion to the bar may no1 be made to depend on citizl'nship. The
holding of that case was simp!~' that the right to practice law is not
a "privilege or immunity" within the menning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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But shortly thereafter, in 1879, Connecticut established
the predecessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens
from the practice of la\\·. 162 Conn., at 253, 294 A. 2d,
at 283. In subsequent decades, wide-ranging restrictions
for the first time began to impair significantly the efforts
of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen occupations."
In the face of this trend. the Court nonetheless held
in 1886 that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's
directive that a State must not "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Yick Tro v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). The
decision in Yick W o invalidated a municipal ordinance
regulating the operation of laundries on the ground that
the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against Chinese operators. Some years later, the Court struck down
an Arizona statute requiring employers of more than five
persons to employ at least 805"o "qualified electors or
native-born citizens of the United States or some subdivision thereof." Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:

"It requires no argument to show that the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. [Citations
omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the
ground of race or nationality, tho prohibition of the
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a
·
.
barren form of words." 239 U. S., at 41.
~

<

To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the employment rights of resident aliens has not been an un0 Sre .J. Higham, Strangcrd in the Land 4G , 161, 183 (2d ed. 1965).
The full scale of restri<'tions impo~cd on the work opportunities of
aliens in 1946 is shown by M. Kom·itz, The Alien and the Asiaticin American Law 190-211 (1946).
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swerving one. 6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies,"
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the
ordinance:

"It was competent for the city to make such a
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class
rather than its objectionable members selected by
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., at 397.
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimination against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations. 7
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were undermined in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U. S.
410 ( 1948), where, in ruling unconstitutional a California
statute barring issuance of fishing licenses to persons
"ineligible to citizenship," the Court stated that "the
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits."
334 U. S., at 420. Indeed, with the issue squarely before
it in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), the
Court concluded that:
"[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insularr
6
See also People v. Cran e, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd
sub norn. Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915) ; but see
Graharn v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374 (1971).
7
See lower court cases collected at Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 1021-1023
(1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending of soft drink~ to the
f'rliing of lightning rods).
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."·
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Footnotes omitted.) s
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State·
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S.
184, 196 ( 1964), a burden which, though variously formulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is
both constitutionally permissible 0 and substantial, 10 and
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the accomplishment" of its purpose 11 or the safeguarding of its
interest.
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the
economy, serve in the armed forces, and contribute in
myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that
a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of
employment opportunities.
8

Although alienage is generally equated with race as a suspect
classification, the Court did not decide in Graham nor do we decide
here whether there might be circumstances, such as armed lw.~tilities
between the United States and the country of whirh an alien is a
citizen, in which alienage would not be suspect.
9 Discrimination or segregation for its own sake is not, of course,
a constitutionally permissible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida. supra.
10 The state interest required has been characterized as "overriding,"
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. l'irginia, 388
U. S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Rirhardson, 403 U. S.,
at 375, "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972),
or "substantial," ibid. We attribute no particular signifir:mce to
these variations in diction.
n .McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196 ; Loving v. l'irginia, 38
U. S., at 11.
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II

We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the
State, has not carried its burden. The State's ultimate
interest here implicated is to assure the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice law. 12 It is undisputed that a State has a constitutionally permissible
and substantial interest in determining whether an applicant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite
for an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970).
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41
(1961); Schwan> v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S.
232, 239 (1956). 13 But no question is raised in this case
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather,
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resident alien.
The Committee defends Rule 8 ( 1) 's requirement that
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the
United States on the ground that the special role of
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given
concrete meaning by a statute 'vhich makes every lawyer
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a
1
~ Appellant denies that this wt~s indeed the State'~ purpose in
requiring citizenship for the practice of law, noting that citizenship
is al~o required of practitioners in other fteld~, int>luding hairdressers
and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architect~. Conn. Gen .
St:1t. § 20-291, :1nd sanitarians, Coun. Gen. Stat. § 20-361. Because
we di"pose of the c:t~e on other grounchi, we do not reach this
cbirn.
1
~ In this ronnertion. :\ Tr. J u~ticc Frnnkfmter wrote:
"From a professional elw.rged with ~uch re~pon~ibilities there must
be exacted those qunlities of truth-spe:tking, of a high sen~e of honor,
of grnnite di::;crction, of the strictest obsetYmlre of fiduri :u~· responsibility, that ha,·e, throughout the renturic~. been compendiou~l.'· described as 'moral character.'" Srh1cm·r "· Board of Bar E~·ami11rrs,
353 U. S. 232, 247 ( 1957) ( conrurriug opinion).
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lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85.
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52- 90. Because of these
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court commented that:
" the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, confidence and respect, but also require them to function in a manner which will foster public confidence
in the profession and , consequently, the judicial system. " 162 Conn., at 262- 263, 294 A. 2d, at 287.
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the
po'>Yers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut,
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power.
"\Ve find these arguments unconvincing. It in no " ·ay
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that
the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, ta.ke recognizances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interest of the United States. Certainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to protect faithfully the interest of his clients. 1 '
frequent]~· rPpre;:ent forrip;n countries and the naof such countries in litigation in the courts of tho United
States, as well as in other matters in this country. In such representation, the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an "officer of
14

Law~·crs

tional ~
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Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for
a wholesale ban.
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no
basis for their finding tha.t he fails to meet these
standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U. S., at 239.
This constitutional warning is especially salient where,
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explicit
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have
acknowledged, a State does have a substantial interest
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short
of showing that the classification established by Rule
8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) is necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest.
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-bycase basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both
the court," is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful
menus, even when those intere3ts are in conflict with the interests
of the United States or of a State. But this representation involves
no confiirt of interest in the invidious sense. Rather, it casts the
lawyer in his honored and t mditionnl role as an aut horized but
independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a client,
whoever it may be. It is conceivable that an alien li censed t o p racti ce law in this country could find himself in a position in which he
might be called upon to represent his country of citizenship against
the United States in circumstances in which there rna~· be a conflict
between his obligations to the two countries. In such rare situations,
an honorable person, whether an alien or not, would decline the
representation.
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an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully
and honestly 15 and a "commissioner's oath" to "support
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of Connecticut." 10 Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both
oaths, 1 ' and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a
character investigation to insure in any given case "that
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forrna
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or·
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116,
132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadm.ond,
supra, 401 U. S., at 164. 18 Moreover, once admitted to·
15

The text of the attorney's oaths is as follows:
"You solemnly swenr that you will do no falsehood, nor consent to
an? to be done in court, and, if you know of any to be done, you
will give information thereof to the judges, or one of them, that it
may be reformed; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue
or cause to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or consent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but
will exercise the office of attorney, within the court wherein you may
practice, according to the best of your learning and discretion, and
with fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so help you God."
J. S. App., p. 44.
16 There is no question as to the validity of requiring an applicant,
as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such an oath.
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164.
17 Because the commissioner's oath is an oath to "support the
constitution of the United States, and the constitution of Connecticut., so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" (emphasis
added), appellant could not of course take the oath as prescribed.
To the e)l.ient that the oath reiterates Rule 8 (l)'s citizenship requirement, it shares the same constitutional defects when required of
prospective members of the bar.
1 8 We find no merit in the contention that. only citizens can in
good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution. "\Ve note
that all persons inducted into the armed sen·iccs, including resident
nliens, arc required by 10 U.S. C.§ 502 to take the following oath:
'·1,
, do solemnly swenr (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the United States against
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will brar true faith and

71-1335-0PINION
10

APPLICATION OF GRIFFITHS

the bar, lawyers arc subject to continuing scrutiny by
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of postadmission sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment. 10 In
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order
to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional
standards. 20
III
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another,
somewhat different argument in support of Rule 8 (1).
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes
allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the order~ of the President of the United States and the orders of the officer~ appointed
over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military
.Justice. So help me God."

If aliens cnn take this oath when the Nation is making usc of their
scn·ices in the nationnl defense, re~>ident alien npplicants for admission to the b:u sure]~· cannot be prcrlnded, ns a clnsH, from t:tking
an oath to support the Constitution on the thcor~· that they are
unable to take the o:tth in good faith.
10 Sec, e. g .. Doolittle \'. Cla1'1,-, 47 Conn. 315 (1879).
Ap:ut from
the courts, the profc~~ion itself has long snbjcetcd it~ members to
discipline under rode~ or canons of professional ct hir~. As carl~· as
1908 the American Bar As~ociation adopted 32 Canons of Profession:\! Et hie". In 1970, following sc\·cral years of st ntl.\· and reexamination, the Ilou~c of Delegates of the American Bar Association approvrd a new Code of Profr~sional Rc~pon~ibilit~·, which provide,; detailed ethical presrriptions as well as n romprchen:-iw rode of
disriplinary rules. The ABA Code of Profes~ional Responsibility hns
,;inrc been npproYcd and ndoptcd in the Di:;t ri<'t of Colnmhia and in
45 States, including Connecticut.
20 Nothing in our rule~ prohibitR from aclmi~~ion to praetiee in
this Court rc:::idcnt aliens who haye bern admitted to pmctice "fol"
three ~:cars pa~t in the highc~t rourt of a State, Tcnitory, Di~trict,
Commonwealth, or Pos~e~~ion" nnd whoRr "pri\·ate and profe~~ionnl
charartrrs shall appcnr to be good." Rule 5, Rules of the Supreme·
Court of the United Stntcs (1970).

I
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necessary to maintain high standards in the legal profession, but rather that lawyers must be citizens almost as a
matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqua1ification
under the Constitution from holding office as President,
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, ~ 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, § 3,
cl. 3. These and numerous other federal and statutory
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee contends, a pervasive recognition that "participation in the
govcrnmen t structure as voters and office holders" is
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief,
p. 11. Offered in support of the claim that the lawyer is
an "office holder" in this sem:e is an enhanced version of
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that
the la\Yyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the
"exercise of actual government po,,·er." Appellee's Brief,
p. 5.

We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This comports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Justice Black in Camm,er v. United States, 350 U. S. 399( 1956):
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte
Garland, 4 WalL 333, 378. The Court pointed out
there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer'
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or
in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is
engaged in a private profession, important though
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment,
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer'
as applied to people serving as officers within the
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405.
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts.
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in government throughout the history of our country. Yet, they
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.
Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law
place one so close to the core of the political process as
to make him a formulator of government policy. 21
We hold that § 8 (I) violates the Equal Protection
Clausc. 22 The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Because the Committrr has failed to establish that the lawyer
is an "offirr holder," we need not and do not decide whether there is
merit in the general argument and, if so, to what offices it would
apply.
~ 2 In a thoughtful opinion, the California Supreme Court unanimously declared unconstitutional a similar California rule. Raffaelli
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, Cal. 3d - , 496 P. 2d 1264,
101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972). See also Application of Park, 484 P. 2d
690 (Alaska 1971) .
21

3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-1336
In re Application of Fre Le Poole On Appeal from the
Supreme Court of
Griffiths for Admission to
Connecticut.
the Bar, Appellant.
[February -, 1973]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opuuon of the
Court.
This case presents a novel question as to the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a
State may require for admission to the bar. Appellant,
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In
1967, she married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of Connecticut. 1 After her graduation
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to
take the Connecticut bar examination. The County Bar
Association found her qualified in all respects save that
she was not a citizen of the United States as required by
Rule 8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963)/ and
1 Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage
to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United States
for more than three years, 8 U. S. C. § 1430 (a). She has not flied
a declaration of intention to become a citizrn of the United States,
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f), and has no present intention of doing so.
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant
would be required to renounce her citizen::;hip of the Netherlands.
8 U.S. C.§ 1448 (a).
2
The rules are promulgated by the judge~ of the Superior Court,
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-80, and administered by the Connecticut Bar

As~ ociation .
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on that account refused to allow her to take the examination. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the
regulation was unconstitutional. Her claim was rejected
first by the Superior Court and ultimately by tho Connecticut Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d 281
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 966
(1972), and now hold that the rule unconstitutionally
discriminates against resident aliens. 3
I

We begin by sketching the background against which
the State Bar Examining Committee attempts to justify
the total exclusion of aliens from the practice of law.
From its inception, our Nation "·elcomed and drew
strength from the immigration of aliens. Their contributions to the social and economic life of the country
wore self-evident, especially during tho periods when the
demand for human resources greatly exceeded the native
supply. This demand was by no means limited to the
unskilled or the uneducated. In 1872, this Court noted
that admission to the practice of law in the courts of a
State
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United
States. It has not, as far as we know, ever been
made in any State, or in any case, to depend on
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to practice, both in the State and Federal courts, who were
not citizens of the United States or of any State."
Bradwell v. The State, 16 Wall. 130, 139 (1872). 4
3 Because we find that thr rulr denir~ rqual protection, wr do not
re.'lrh appellant's ot hrr claim~.
4
We do not , of rour~e, rel)· on Bradu•ell to r,.:tnbli~h that admission to the bar may not br madr to deprnd on citizen~hip. The
holding of that case was simp])' that the right to practice law is not
a "privilege or immunity" within the mcnning of the Fourtcrnth
Amrndment.
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But shortly thereafter, in 1879, Connecticut established
the predecessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens
from the practice of law. 162 Conn., at 253, 294 A. 2d,
at 283. In subsequent decades, wide-ranging restrictions
for the first time began to impair significantly the efforts
of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen occupations.r.
In the face of this trend. the Court nonetheless held
in 1886 that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's
directive that a State must not "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). The
decil'lion in Yick fVo invalidated a municipal ordinance
regulating the operation of laundries on the ground that
the ordi11ance was discriminatorily enforced against Chinese operators. Some years later, the Court struck down
an Arizona statute requiring employers of more than five
persons to employ at least 80% "qualified electors or
natiYe-born citizens of the United States or some subdivision thereof." 'l'ruax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915).
As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:

"It requires no argument to show that the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. [Citations
omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the
denial of equal protection of the la.ws would be a
barren form of words." 239 U.S., at 41.

<.

To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the employment rights of resident aliens has not been an unfi Sec J. Higham, Strangrrs in the Land 4G. 161, 183 (2d ed. 1965).
The full scalr of re~trirtions imposrcl on the work opportunities of
aliens in 1946 is shown by 1VI. Kom·itz, The Alien and the Asiaticin American Law 190-211 (1946).

~
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swerving one. 6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies,"
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the·
ordinance:
"It was competent for the city to make such a
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class
rather than its objectionable members selected by
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., a.t 397.
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimination against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations. 7
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were undermined in Takahashi v. Fish and Garne Cornrn'n, 334 U.S.
410 ( 1948), where, in ruling unconstitutional a California
statute barring issuance of fishing licenses to persons
"ineligible to citizenship," the Court stated that "the
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits."
334 U. S., at 420. Indeed, with the issue squarely before
it in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), the
Court concluded that:
"[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'·
See also People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd
sub nom. Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915); but sec
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374 (1971).
7
Sec lower court cases collected at Note, Con titutionality of Restrictiom: on Alien::;' Right to Work, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 1021-1023
(1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending of soft drink::; to the
srlling of lightning rods).
6
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.'"
Graharn v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Footnotes omitted.) 8
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 ( 1964), a burden which, though variously formulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is
both constitutionally permissible o and substantial, 10 and
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the accomplishment" of its purpose 11 or the safeguarding of its
interest.
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the·
economy, serve in the armed forces, and contribute in
myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that
a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of
employment opportunities.
8 Although alienage is generally equated with race as a suspect
classification, the Court did not decide in Graham nor do we decide
here whether there might be circumstances, such as armed hostilities
between the United States and the country of which an alien is a
citizen, in which alienage would not be suspect.
9 Discrimination or segregation for its own sake is not, of course,.
a constitutionally permicsible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra.
10 The state interest required has been characterized as "overriding,"
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Viroinia, 388
U. S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Richardson , 403 U. S.,
at 375, "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972),
or "substantial," ibid. We attribute no particubr signific:mce to
these variations in diction.
11 M cLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at Hl6; Loving v. Virginia, 388
U. S., at 11.
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We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the
State, has not carried its burden. The State's ultimate
interest here implicated is to assure the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice law. 12 It is undisputed that a State has a constitutionally permissible
and substantial interest in determining whether an applicant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite
for an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970).
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41
(1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S.
232, 239 (1956). 1 3 But no question is raised in this case
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather,
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resident alien.
The Committee defends Rule 8 (I)'s requirement that
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the
United States on the ground that the special role of
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the
maxim that a la.wyer is an "officer of the court" is given
concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a
12
Appellant drnir~ that thi~ "·a~ inclerd the Statc'ci purpose in
rrquiring citizen~hip for the prartiee of law, noting that citizenf'hip
i~ alHo rectuircd of practitioners in other ficldN, inelucling hn irclre~scrs
and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stnt. § 20-250, nrehitects, Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 20-291, nne! ~unitarians, Conn. Gen. Stnt. § 20-3Gl. Bcrnuse
wr di~po~r of thr cn~e on othrr grounds, we do not rr:1ch ihi;;
claim.
n In this connection, "\Ir ..Tn~tire Fr:mkfurter wrotr:

"From a profe~sional charged with ~uch rr-<ponsibilities thrrc must
be exacted those qunlitirs of truth-RJWaking, of n high sen~c of honor,
of granite discretion, of the strietrst ob~eiTaJJcc of fidurinr~· responsibility, that have, throughout the rentmies, been romprncliou~l.'· clesrribcd as 'moral character.'" Schwarr Y. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 2-1:7 (1957) (concurring opinion).
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lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and
acknO\vledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85.
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-90. Because of these
and other pO\Yers, the Connecticut Supreme Court commented that:
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyaHy, confidence and respect. but also require them to function in a manner which will foster public confidence
in the profession and, consequently, the judicial system." 162 Conn., at 262-263, 294 A. 2d, at 287.
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut,
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance
to this country "·ith a resident alien's possible conflict
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power.
We find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way
denigrates a la,Yyer's high responsibilities to observe that
the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interest of the United States. Certainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to protect faithfully the interest of his clients. 14
14
L:twycrs frequent!~· rPprc,cnt forei~~:n roun1 ric:; and the nationald of surh countries in litigatio11 in tho courts of the United
States, ns well as in other matters in this country. In such rrprescntn.tion, the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as nn "officer o[
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Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for
a wholesale ban.
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these
standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U. S., at 239.
This con stitutional warning is especially salient where,
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explicit
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have
acknowledged, a State does have a substantial interest
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of
law, the arguments adva.nced by the Committee fall short
of showing that the classification established by Rule
8 ( 1) of the Connecticut Practice Book ( 1963) is necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest.
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-bycase basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both
the court ," is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful
means, eYen when those interests are in conflict with the in terests
of the United States or of a State. But this r epre~ entati on involves
no conflict of interest in the invidious sense. Rather , it casts the
lawyer in hiR honored and t radi tional role as an authorized but
independrnt agent acting t o vindicat e the legal rights of a client,
whoever it may be. It is conceivable that an alien licensed t o p ractice law in this country could find himself in a position in which he
might be called upon to represent his country of citizenship against
the United Stat es in circumst anccs in which t here may be a conHict
bet\\·een hi:> obligations to the two countries. In such rare situations,
an honorable person, whether an alien or not, would decline the
reprc:>entation.
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an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully
and honestly 15 and a "commissioner's oath" to "support
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of Connecticut." 16 Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both
oaths, 17 and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a
character investigation to insure in any given case "that
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116,
132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadrnond,
supra, 401 U. S., at 164_18 Moreover, once admitted to
The text of the nttorney's oaths is as follows:
"You solemnly swenr that you will do no falsehood, nor consent io
an~· to be done in court, and, if you know of any to be done, you
will give information thereof to the judges, or one of them, that it
may be reformed; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue
or cause to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or consent, to ihe same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but
will exercise the office of attorney, within the court wherein you may
practice, according to the best of your learning and discretion, and
with fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so help you God."
J. S. App., p. 44.
16 There is no question ns to the validity of requiring an applicant,
as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such an oath.
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164.
17 Because the commissioner's oath is an oath to "support the
constitution of the United States, and the constitution of Connecticut, so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" (emphnsis
added), appellant could not of course take the oath as prescribed.
To the extent that the onth reiterates Rule 8 (1)'s citizenship requirement, it shares the same constitutional defects when required of
prospective members of the bar.
18 Wo find no m<'rit in 1he contention that. only citizens can in
good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution. We note
that all persons inducted into the armed smTiec;:, including resident
nliens, arc required by 10 U. S. C. § 502 to tnkc the following oath:
'·I,
, do solemnly swear (or aJTirm) that I will
support and defend the Con titution of the United States against
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
15
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the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of postadmission sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment. 10 In
swn, the Committee simply has not established that it
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order
to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional
standards. 20
III
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another,
somewhat different argmnent in support of Rule 8 (1).
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes
nllegiance to the ~ame; and that I will obey the order~ of the Prrsident of the United States and tho order~ of tlw officer~ appointed
o\'er me, according to regulations and tho Uniform Code of Military
.Ju~tico. So help me God."

If aliens ran take this oath when tho Nation i~ making nse of their
r::er\'ices in the national defense, re~ident nlien applicant~ for ndmission to the bar smel~· cannot be precluded, as a rlas:<, from tr1king
nn o:~th to support the Con~titution on the theory that th('y are
unable to tnke the onth in good faith.
1
Apart from
" Sec, e. g .. Doolittle\'. Clark, 47 Conn. 316 (1879).
tho courts, the prol'o~~ion itself has long subjoctrd its members to
di~C'ipline nndrr rodr~ or canons of profcs::'ional ethiP~. As early as
1908 the American Bar As~ociation adopted 32 Canons of Professional Ethirs. In 1970, following se,·oral ~·cars of stud~· and rePx:unination, tho House of Dolegatr~ of tho American l3:tr As~ori:t
tion appro\·ed n 110\\' Code of Profo~~ional ne~pon"ibilit~·, whi('h pro\'idr:> drtailed rt bien! prescriptions n~ well a;; a comprrheH~i,·e rode of
disriplinar~· mlrs. The ABA Code of Professional nr~ponsibility has
sinro been approwd and adoptrcl in the Di,-( rirt of Columbia nnd in
46 StateR, inrludinp; Connortirut.
20 Nothing in om ru le" prohibit" from admi,-sion t.o prartire in
this Court rr~iclrnt aliens who haYo brrn :1dmittecl to prac·t icc "for
throe years pai't in the hip;he~t rourt of n State. Territor~·. Di,trict,
Commonwealth, or Pos:;r""ion" and whosr "private and profe,.:,-ionnl
rhameters shall appear to be good." Rule 5, Rulf's of the Supreme
Comt of the United States (1970).

I
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necessary to maintain high standards in the legal profession, but rather that ]a\\'yrrs must be citizens almost as a
matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification
under the Constitution from holding office as President,
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, ~ 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, § 3,
cl. 3. These a11d num0rous other federal and statutory
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee contends, a pervasive recognition that "participation in the
government structure as voters and office holders" is
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief,
p. 11. Offered in support of the claim that the lawyer is
an "office holder" in this sen~e is an enhanced version of
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief,
p. 5.
·we note at the outset that this argument goes beyond
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This comports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Justice Black in Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399'
(1956):
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out
there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer'
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or
in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a. lawyer is
engaged in a private profession, important though
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment,
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer'
as applied to people serving as officers within the
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405.
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts.
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in government throughout the history of our country. Yet, they
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.
Nor does the status of holding a. license to practice law
place one so close to the core of the political process as
to make him a formulator of government policy. 2 1
We hold that § 8 ( 1) violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 22 The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
21

Because the Committ ee has failed to establish thnt t he lawyer
is an "office holder," we need not and do not decide whether there is
merit in the general argument and, if so, to what offices it would
apply.
2
" In a thoughtful opinion , t he California Supreme Court unanimously declared unconstit utional a similar California rule. Raf!aelli
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, Cal. 3d - , 496 P. 2d 1264,
101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (19i2). See also Application of Park, 484 P . 2d
690 (Alaska 1971) .
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MR. JusTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the·
Court.
This case presents a novel question as to the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a
State· may require for admission to the bar. Appellant,
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands camve
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In
1967, she married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of Connecticut. 1 After her graduation
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission t(}
take the Connecticut bar examination. The County Bar
Association found her qualified in all respects save that
she was not a citizen of the United States as required by
Rule 8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963)/ and
1 Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage
to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United States
for more than three years, 8 U. S. C. § 1430 (a). She has not filed
a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States,
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f), and has no present intention of doing so.
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Ncthcrlands.
8 U. S. C. § 1448 (a).
2
The rules are promulgated by the judges of the Superior Court,
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-80, and administered IJy the Connecticut Bar
~s ·ociation.
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on that account refused to allow her to take the examination. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the
regulation was unconstitutional ;fer claim was rejected
first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d 281
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 96
( 1972), and now hold that the rule unconstitutionall
discriminates against resident aliens."
I

We begin by sketching the background against which
the State Bar Exarnining Committee attempts to justify
the total exclusion of aliens from the practice of law.
From its inception, our Nation welcomed and drew
strength from the immigration of aliens. Their contributions to ·the social and economic life of the country
were self-evident, especially during the periods when the
demand for human resources greatly exceeded the native
supply. This demand was by no means limited to the
unskilled or the uneducated. In 1872, this Court noted
that admission to the practice of law in the courts of a
State
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United
States. It has not, as far as we know, ever been
made in any State, or in any case, to depend on
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to practice, both in the State and Federal courts, who were
not citizens of the United States or of any State."
Bradwell v. 'Phe State, 16 Wall. 130, 139 (1872).<
Because \H' find thnt thr rulr cknir~ rqunl protection , we do not
reach appellant's othrr rlaim8.
1
We do not , of ronr~c, rrl~· on Bradwell to rstnblish that admission to the bar may not be mnde to drprncl on ritizcn~hip. The
holding of that rase wns simply that the right to practice bw is not
a "privilege or immuniiy" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendnwnt.
3
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But shortly thereafter, in 1879, Connecticut established
the predecessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens
from the practice of law. 162 Conn., at 253, 294 A. 2d,
at 283. In subsequent decades, wide-ranging restrictions
for the first time began to impair significantly the efforts
of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen occupations."
In the face of this trend, the Court nonetheless held
in 1886 that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" \Yithin the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's
directive that a State must not "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). The
decision in Yick Wo invalidated a municipal ordinance
regulating the operation of laundries on the ground that
the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against Chinese operators. Some years later, the Court struck clown
an Arizona statute requiring employers of more than five
persons to employ at least 805-'o "qualified electors or
native-born citizens of the United States or some subdivision thereof." 'Pnwx v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:

"It requires no argument to show that the right to
work for a living in the conunon occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. ·[Citations
omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a
(
barren form of words." 239 U. S., at 41.
To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the employment rights of resident aliens has not been an unSee J. Higham, Stranger~ in tho Lnnd 4n , 161 , 183 (2d ed. 1965).
The full sralo of reHtrirlions imposed on tho work opportunities of
aliens in 1946 is shown by Ivi. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic
in Ameriran L:nv 190-211 (1946).
5

0
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swerving one. 6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies,"
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the
ordinance:
"It was competent for the city to make such a
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class
rather than its objectionable members selected by
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., at 397.
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimination against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations. 7
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were undermined in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410 (1948), where, in ruling unconstitutional a California
statute barring issuance of fishing licenses to persons
"ineligible to citizenship," the Court stated that "the
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits."
334 U. S., at 420. Indeed, with the issue squarely before
it in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), the
Court concluded that:

I

" [ C] lassifications based on alienage, like those based
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
See also People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd
sub nom. Cmne v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915); but sec
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 355, 374 (1971) .
7
Sec lower court cases collected at N otc, Constitut ionality of Rest ri ctions on Aliens' RighL to Work, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 10:21-1023
(1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending of soft drinks to the
selling of lightning rods).
6
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Footnotes omitted.)<.
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 ( 1964), a burden which, though variously formulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interes . .
g
both constitutionally permissible an substantial, and
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the ac~omplishment" of its purpose 4'!1 or the safeguardmg of les -1
mterest. 11
I 10
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the·
economy, serve in the armed forces, and contribute in
myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that
a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of
employment opportunities.

9

~ pnisrriminatwn or segregation for its own sake is not, of course,
a constitutionally permissible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra.
The state interest required has been characterized as "overriding,"
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388
U. S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.,
at 375, "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972),
or "substantial," ibid. We attribute no particular significance to
these variations in diction.
/ O~McLaughlin v. Flo1·ida, 379 U.S., at 19G ; Loving v. Virginia, 388
U. S., at 11.

9 I-":':",

11
We did not decide in Graham nor do we decide
-

here whether special circumstances, such as armed
hostilities between the United States and the country
of which an alien is a citizen, would justify the use
of a classification based on alienage.
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We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the
State, has not carried its burden. The State's ultimate
interest here implicated is to assure the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice law.' 2 It is undisputed that a State has a constitutionally permissible
and substantial interest in determining whether an applicant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite
for an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970).
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41
(1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S.
232, 239 (1956). 13 But no question is raised in this case
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather,
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resident alien.
The Committee defends Rule 8 (I)'s requirement that
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the
United States on the ground that the special role of
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given
concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a
12
Apprlln.nt denies thnt thi~ wns indeed the Stnte's purpose in
requiring citizenship for the practice of law, noting that citizenship
is ul8o required of prartitioners in other fields, inC'htding hairdressers
nne! cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architects, Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 20-291, and sanitarians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-361. Because
we di:,;po~e of the case on other grmmdl!', we do not reach 1his
claim.
1
a In this connection , ::\Jr. Ju~til'e Frnnkfurter wrote:
"From ::t professi<;mal charged with such rP~pon:,;ibilities there must
be exacted those qualities of truth-spanking, of a high sense of honor,
of granite discretion, of the strirtest ob,;en·anee of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compcndiou~ly described as 'moral character.'" Schwan' Y. Boa1'd of Bar Examiucrs,
353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (conl'urriug opinion).
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lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take
recognizances, administer oaths and ta.ke depositions and
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85.
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-90. Because of these
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court commented that:
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, confidence and respect, but also require them to function in a manner which will foster public confidence
in the profession and, consequently, the judicial system." 162 Conn., at 262-263, 294 A. 2d, at 287.
In order to establish a link between citiilenship and the
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut,
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power.
'\Ve find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that
the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, ta.ke recognizances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interest of the United States. Certainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fa.il to protect faithfully the interest of his clients. 14
Lawrers frequrntl~· rrpre;:ent forrign countries and the naof such countries in litigation in the courts of the United
States, as well as in other matters in this country. In such representation, the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an "officer of
14

tional~
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Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for
a wholesale ban.
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these
standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U. S., at 239.
This constitutional warning is especially salient where,
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explicit
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have
acknowledged, a State does have a substantial interest
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short
of showing that the classification established by Rule
8 (I) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) is necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest.
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-bycase basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both
the court," is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful
means, even when those interests are in conflict with the interests
of the United States or of a State. But this representation involves
no conflict of interest in the invidious sense. Rather, it casts the
lawyer in his honored and traditional role as an authorized but
independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a client,
whoever it may be. It is conceivable that an alien licensed to practice law in this country could find himself in a position in which he
might be called upon to represent his country of citizenship against
the United States in circumstances in which there may be a conflict
between his obligations to the two countries. In such rare sit,uations,
an honorable person, whether an alien or not, would decline the
representation.
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an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully
and honestly 15 and a "commissioner's oath" to "support
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of Connecticut." 10 Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both
oaths/ 7 and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a
character investigation to insure in any given case "that
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or·
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floy.d, 385 U. S. 116,
132.'' Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond,
supra, 401 U. S., at 164. 18 Moreover, once admitted toThe text of the attorney's oaths is as follows:
"You solemnly swear that you will do no falsehood, nor consent toany to be done in court, and, if you know of any to be done, you
will give information thereof to the judges, or one of them, that it
may be reformed; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue
or cause to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or consent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but
will exercise the office of attorney, within the court wherein you may
practice, acl'ording to the best of your learning and discretion, and
with fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so help you God.".
J. S. App., p. 44.
10 There is no question as to the validity of requiring an applicant,
as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such an oath.
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164.
17 Because the commissioner's oath is an oath to "support the·
constitution of the United States, and the constitution of Connecticut, so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" (emphasis
added), appellant could not of course take the oath as prescribed.
To the extent that the oath reiterates Rule 8 ( 1) 's citizenship requirement, it shares the same constitutional defects when required of
prospective members of the bar.
1 8 We find no merit in the contention that only citizens can in
good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution. We note
that all per~ons inducted into the armed sen·ices, including re::;ident
aliens, are required by 10 U. S. C. § 502 to take the following oath:
"I,
, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the United St.1tcs against
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
15
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the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of postadmission sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment. 19 In
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order
to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional
standards. 20
III
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another,
somewhat different argument in support of Rule 8 (1).
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes
allegiance to the ~arne; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the offircr;; appointed
over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military
.Justire. So help me God."
If aliens can take this oath when the Nation i ~ making usc of their
services in the national defense, resident alien applicants for admission to the bar smdy cannot be prcrludcd, as a class, from taking
an oath to support the Constitution on the theory that they are
unnble to take the oath in good faith.
19 See, e. g., Doolittle\'. C/a!'k, 47 Conn. 3Hi (1879).
Apart from
the courts, the profcs~ ion itself has long subjected its members to
discipline under rode~ or canons of profes~ ional ethirs. As early as
1908 the American Bar Association adopted 32 Canons of Professional Ethir~ . In 1970, following severn! years of stud~· and reexamination, the Hou ~e of Delegates of the American Bar ARsociation approved a new Code of Profe:<sional Rr~ pon~ibility , which provides detailed et hirnl prescriptions ns well ns n rompr<•hpn~iw rode of
disciplinary rulPs. The ABA Code of Profe~~ional Re~ponsibility has '
since been approv<'d and adoptPd in the Di>'t rirt of Columbia and in
46 States, including Connecticut.
20 Nothing in our mle;;: prohibit :< from ndmi~sion t.o practice in
this Court re~idcnt aliens who luwc been ndmitl<'d to praet ire " for
three ~·ea rs pn~t in thr highr~t ronrt of a Statr, Trrritory, Di:-;t rict,
Commonwcnlth, or Pos~es~ ion" and whose " pri\·ate and profe~.~ ional
characters shall appear to be good." Rule 5, Rules of the Supremo
Court of the United States (1970) .
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necessary to maintain high standards in the legal profession , but rather that lawyers must be citizens almost as a
matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification
under the Constitution from holding office as President,
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, § 3,
cl. 3. These and numerous other federal and statutory
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee contends, a pervasive recognition that "participation in the
government structure as voters and office holders" is
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief,
p. 11. Offered in support of the claim that the lawyer is
an "office holder'' in this sense is an enhanced version of
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer
of the court." Specifica.lly, the Committee states that
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief,
p. 5.
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This comports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Justice Black in Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399"
(1956):
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out
there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer'
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or
in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is
engaged in a private profession, important though
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment,
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The
"·ord 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer'
as applied to people serving as officers within the
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405.
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts.
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in government throughout the history of our country. Yet, they
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.
Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law
place one so close to the core of the political process as
to make him a formulator of government policy. 21
We hold that § 8 ( 1) violates the Equal Protection
Clausc.22 The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
21
B erau ~e the Committee has failed to estu bli~ h that the lawyer
is an "office holder," we need not and do not decide whether t here is
merit in the general argument and, if so, to what offices it would

appl~· .
22
In a t houghtful opinion, t he California Supreme Court unani-·
mously declared unconstitutional a similar Cali fo rnia rule. Raffaelli
v. Committee of Bm· E xaminers, Cal. 3d - , 496 P. 2d 1264,
101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972). See al~o Application of Park , 484 P . 2d
690 (Alaska 1971) .

NOTE: Where It Is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as Is belnl:' done In connection with this case, at the time
the opinion Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader. See United Btatea v. Detroit Lumber
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
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MR. JusTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents a novel question as to the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a
State may require for admission to the bar. Appellant,
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, is a citizen of the Netherlands who
came to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor.
In 1967 she married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of Connecticut. 1 After her graduation
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to
take the Connecticut bar examination. The County Bar
Association found her qualified in all respects save that
she was not a citizen of the United States as required by
Rule 8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963), 2 and
Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage
to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United States
for more than three years, 8 U. S. C. § 1430 (a). She has not filed
a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States,
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f) , and has no present intention of doing so.
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Netherlands.
8 U. S. C. § 1448 (a ) .
2 The rules are promulgated by the judges of the Superior Court,
Conn. Gen . Stat. §§ 51-80, and administered by the Connecticut Bar
Association. The position of the State in this case is represented by
the State Bar Examining Committee.
1
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on that account refused to allow her to take the examination. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the
regulation was unconstitutional but her claim was rejected first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the
Connecticut Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d
281 (1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S.
966 ( 1972), and now hold that the rule unconstitutionally
discriminates against resident aliens. 3
I

We begin by sketching the background against which
the State Bar Examining Committee attempts to justify
the total exclusion of aliens from the practice of law.
From its inception, our Nation welcomed and drew
strength from the immigration of aliens. Their contributions to the social and economic life of the country
were self-evident, especially during the periods when the
demand for human resources greatly exceeded the native
supply. This demand was by no means limited to the
unskilled or the uneducated. In 1872, this Court noted
that admission to the practice of law in the courts of a
State
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United
States. It has not, as far as we know, ever been
made in any State, or in any case, to depend on
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to practice, both in the State and Federal courts, who were
not citizens of the United States or of any State."
Bradwell v. The State, 16 Wall. 130, 139 (1872). 4
Because we find that the rule denies equal protection, we do not
reach appellant.'s other claims.
4 We do not, of course, rely on Bradwell to establish that admission to the bar may not be made ·to depend on citizenship. The
holding of that case was simply that the right to practice law is not
a "privilege or immunity" wi.thin the meaning of the Fourteenth
.Amendment.
3
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But shortly thereafter, in 1879, Connecticut established
the predecessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens
from the practice of law. 162 Conn., at 253, 294 A. 2d,
at 283. In subsequent decades, wide-ranging restrictions
for the first time began to impair significantly the efforts
of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen occupations. 5
In the face of this trend, the Cour't nonetheless held
in 1886 that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's
directive that a State must not "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). The
decision in Yick Wo invalidated a municipal ordinance
regulating the operation of laundries on the ground that
the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against Chinese operators. Some years later, the Court struck down
an Arizona statute requiring employers of more than five
persons to employ at least 80% "qualified electors or
native-born citizens of the United States or some subdivision thereof." Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915).
As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:
"It requires. no argument to show that the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. [Citations
omitted.] If this could be refused· solely upon the
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a
barren form of words." 239 U. S., at 41.
To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the employment rights of resident aliens has not been an unSee J. Higham, Strangers in the Land 46, 161 , 183 (2d ed. 1965) ..
The full scale of restrictions imposed on the work opportunities of
aliens in 1946 is shown by M. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic:
in. American Law 190-211 (1946),.
5
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swerving one. 6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392
(1927) , the Court was faced with a challenge to a city
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies,"
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the
ordinance:
"It was competent for the city to make such a
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class
rather than its objectionable members selected by
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., at 397.
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimination against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations. 7
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were undermined in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U. S.
410 ( 1948) , where, in ruling unconstitutional a California
statute barring issuance of fishing licenses to persons
"ineligible to citizenship," the Court stated that "the
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien
iiiliabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits."
334 U. S., at 420. Indeed, with the issue squarely before
it in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), the
Court concluded that:
"[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
6 See alJ>o People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd
sub nom. Crane v. N ew York , 239 U. S. 195 (1915) ; but see
Graham v. R ichardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374 (1971) .
7
'
See lower court cases collected at Note, Constitutionalit y of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 1021-1023
(1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending of soft drinks to the
selling of lightning rods) .
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Footnotes omitted.)
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S,
184, 196 ( 1964), a burden which, though variously for ..
mulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classifica•
tion, a State must show th.a t its purpose or interest is
both constitutionally permissible 8 and substantial, 9 and
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the accomplishment" of its purpose 10 or the safeguarding of its
interest. 11
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the
economy, serve in the armed ·forces, and contribute in
myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that
a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of
employment opportunities.
8 Discrimination or segregation for its own sake is not, of course,
a constitutionally permissible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra.
9 The state interest required has been characterized as "overriding,"
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196 ;' Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.,
at 375, "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972),
or "substantial," ibid. We ·attribute no particular significance to
these variations in diction.
'lo McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388
U. S., at 11.
11 We did not decide in Graham nor do we decide here whether
special circumstances, such as armed hostilities between the United
States and the country of which an alien is a citizen, would justify
the use of a classification based on alienage.
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II
We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the
State, has not carried its burden. The State's ultimate
interest here implicated is to assure the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice law. 12 It is undisputed that a State has a constitutionally permissible
and substantial interest in determining whether an applicant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite
foc an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Re·
search Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970).
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41
(1961); Schware v. Board· of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S.
232, 239 (1956). 1 3 But no question is raised in this case
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather,
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resident alien.
The Comll1ittee defends Rule 8 ( 1) 's requirement that
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the
United States on the ground that the special role of
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given
concrete meaning by a. statute which makes every lawyer
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a
Appellnnt d e ni e~ that thiti wns ind()('d the Stnt e's purpose in
requiring citizenship for the practice of law, noting that citizenship
is also required of practitioners in other fields, including hnirdressers
and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20--250, architects, Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 20--291 , and sanitarians, Conn. Gen. Stat .. § 20-361. Because
we dispose of the case on other grounds, we do not reach this.
claim.
1 3 In this connec tion , l\Ir . .Juti tice Frankfurter wrote :
"From a profestiional charged with such rrspon ·ibilities there must
be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high srnse of honor,
of granit e discrrtion, of the strictest ob~erva n ce of fidu ciary r esponsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compe ndiou s!~· described as 'moral cha racter.'" Schware v. Board of Bar Examinet·s,
353 U. S. 232, 2.47 (1957.) (concurring opinion) .
12
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lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85.
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-90. Because of these
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court commented that:
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, confidence and respect, but also require them to function in a manner which will foster public confidence
in the profession and, consequently, the judicial system." 162 Conn., at 262-263, 294 A. 2d, at 287.
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut,
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power.
We find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that
the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interest of the United States. Certainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to protect faithfully the interest of his clients. 14
14 Lawyers frequently represent foreign countries and the nationals of such countries in litigation in the courts of the United
States, as well as in other matters in this country. In such representation, the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an "officer of
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Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for
a wholesale ban.
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers o£
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these
standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U. S., at 239.
This constitutional warning is especially salient where,
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explicit
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have
acknowledged, a State does have a substantial interest
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short
of showing that the classification established ' by Rule
8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) is necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest.
Connecticut ha-s wide freedom to gauge on a case-bycase basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both
the court," is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful
means, even when those interests are in conflict with the interests
of the United States or of a State. But this representation involves
no conflict of interest in the invidious sense. Rather, it casts the
lawyer in his honored and traditional role as an authorized but
independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a client,
whoever it may be. It is conceivable that an alien licensed to practice law in this country could · find himself in a position in which he
might be called upon to represent his country of citizenship against
the United States in circumstances in which there may be a conflict
between his obligations to the two countries. In such rare situations,
an honorable person, whether an alien or not, would decline the
representation.
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an "attorney's oath" to perform 'his functions faithfully
and honestly 15 and a "commissioner's oath" to "support
the Constitution of the Un!ted States, and the Constitution of Connecticut." to Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both
oaths, 17 and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a
character investigation to insure in any given case "that
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116,
132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond,
supra, 401 U. S., at 164. 18 Moreover, once admitted to
15

The text of the attorney's oaths is as follows:
"You solemnly swear that you will do no falsehood, nor consent to
any to be done in court, and, if you know of any to be done, you
will give information thereof to the judges, or one of them, that it
may be reformed; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue
or cause to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or consent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but
will exercise the office of attorney, within the court wherein you may
·practice, according to the best of your learning and discretion, and
with fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so help you God."
J. S. App., p. 44.
16 There is no qu~stion liS to the validity of requiring an applicant,
as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such an oath.
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164.
17 Because the commissioner's o11th is an oath to "support the
constitution of the United States, and the constitution of Connecticut, so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" . (emphasis
added), appell11nt could not of course t11ke the oath as prescribed.
To the extent that the oath reiterates Rule 8 ( 1) 's citizenship requirement, it shares the same constitution11l defects when required of
prospective members of the bar:
18 We find no merit in the contention that only citizens can in
good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution. We note
that all persons inducted into the armed services, including resident
aliens, are required by 10 U. S.C. § 502 . to t11ke the following oath:
"I,
, do solemnly swear (or affirm) th11t I will
·support and defend the Constitution of the United States against
·all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
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the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of postadmission sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment. 10 In
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order
to. vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional
standards. 20

III
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another,
somewhat different argument in support of Rule 8 (1).
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes
allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed
over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military
.Justice. So help me God.'~
If aliens can take this oath when the Nation is making use of their
services in the national defense, resident alien applicants for admission to the bar surely cannot be precluded, as a class, from taking
an oath to support the Constitution on the theory that they are
unable to take the oath in good faith .
10 See, e. g .. Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316 (1879).
Apart from
the courts, the profession itself has long subjected its members to
discipline under codes or canons of professional ethics. As early as
1908 the American Bar Association adopted 32 Canons of Professional Ethics. In 1970, following several years of stud~· and re~
examination, the House of Delegates of the American Bar . Associa~
tion approved a new Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides detailed ethical prescriptions as well as a comprehensive code of
disciplinary rules. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility has
since been approved and adopted in the District of Columbia and in
46 States, including Connecticut.
20 Nothing in our rules prohibits from admission t.o practice in
this Court resident aliens who have been admitted to practice "for
three years past in the highest court of a State, Territory, District,
Commonwealth, or Possession" and whose "private and professional
characters shall appear to be good." Rule .5, Rules of the Supreme .
Court of the United States (1970). .
·
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necessary to maintain high standards in the legal profession, but rather that lawyers must be citizens almost as a
matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification
under the Constitution from holding office as President,
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, § 3,
cl. 3. These and numerous other federal and statutory
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee contends, a pervasive recognition that "participation in the
government structure as voters and office holders" is
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief,
p. 11. Offered in support of the claim that the lawyer is
an "office holder" in this sense is an enhanced version of
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief,
p. 5.
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This comports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Justice Black in Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399
(1956):
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out
there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer'
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or
in any other case drcided by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is
engaged in a private profession, important though
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment,
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer'
as applied to people serving as officers within the
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405.
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts.
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and
natural interests. lawyers have been leaders in government throughout the history of our country. Yet, they
arc not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.
Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law
place onr so close to the core of the political process as
to make him a formulator of government policy.n
We hold that ~ 8 ( 1) violates the Equal Protection
Clause.~~ Tlw judgnwnt of the Connecticut Supreme
Court is revers('cl, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
~ 1 Br('ali~P

thr C'ornnutt<·<' hn~ fniiC'd to r~tnbli~h that the lawyer
is an ·'ufliep holdrr," II'<' Mrd not and do not clreidP whPther there is
merit in the p;eneral arp;unwnt and, if ::;o, to what office:; it would
apply.
22 In a thoughtful opmiOil. thr Califomia Ruprrme Court unanimou::;ly dPehtrl'd liiH'on~titut10nal a :;imilnr California rule. Raffaelli
v. Committee of Bar R:wnnner8, Cal. ;{d - , 496 P. 2d 1264,
101 Cal. Hptr. 896 (1972) SrP also Application of Park, 484 P. 2d
690 (Alaska 1971 ) .

